Fiscal oversight of the budget for strategic sealift, fiscal years 1981-1994 by Steinmetz, Mark Joseph
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1994-06
Fiscal oversight of the budget for strategic sealift,
fiscal years 1981-1994
Steinmetz, Mark Joseph








Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Fiscal Oversight of the Budget for
Strategic Sealift, Fiscal Years 1981-1994
by
Mark Joseph Steinmetz
Lieutenant, Supply Corps, United States Navy
B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1982
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of




REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching
existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this
burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services,
Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management
and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
June 1994
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's Thesis
TITLE AND SUBTITLE FISCAL OVERSIGHT OF THE BUDGET
FOR STRATEGIC SEALIFT, FISCAL YEARS 1981-1994
6. AUTHOR(S) MARK JOSEPH STEINMETZ
5. FUNDING NUMBERS






SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
*A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
This thesis examines congressional oversight of strategic sealift programs. The historical background
and elements of strategic sealift are explained. The composition and size of the strategic sealift budget is
examined, as are the structure and tools of congressional oversight. The budget for strategic sealift is
examined from presidential request through final appropriations over the 14 year period between 1980 and
1993. Changes made during the authorization and appropriations sequences are explained, and differences
between the House and Senate support are identified. Congress and the executive branch did not agree on
the priority to be given to strategic sealift programs, with Congress approving significantly larger budgets
for this program than DoD requested. The Senate was slightly more supportive of sealift programs than
was the House. In keeping with their customary roles within the budget process, the authorization
committees provided the majority of policy guidance using study requirements and report language. The
appropriations committees deviated from their traditional roles by providing constant and substantial
budget increases above the levels set by the authorization committees.





















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines congressional oversight of strategic sealift programs.
The historical background and elements of strategic sealift are explained. The
composition and size of the strategic sealift budget is examined, as are the structure
and tools of congressional oversight. The budget for strategic sealift is examined
from presidential request through final appropriations over the 14 year period
between 1980 and 1993. Changes made during the authorization and
appropriations sequences are explained, and differences between the House and
Senate support are identified. Congress and the executive branch did not agree on
the priority to be given to strategic sealift programs, with Congress approving
significantly larger budgets for this program than DoD requested. The Senate was
slightly more supportive of sealift programs than was the House. In keeping with
their customary roles within the budget process, the authorization committees
provided the majority of policy guidance using study requirements and report
language. The appropriations committees deviated from their traditional roles by
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This chapter will address the objective of the thesis. It
describes the research questions, the scope, limitations,
methodology and organization of the chapters.
A. OBJECTIVES
The objective of the thesis is to summarize the historical
background and recent history, and identify the trends and
issues affecting congressional oversight of strategic sealift.
These trends are explored by examining the President's budget
request and the accompanying congressional response, i.e., the
funding levels approved during the authorization and
appropriations sequences of the congressional budget process.
This information is relevant to theories concerning
congressional intervention and initiatives and focuses on an
area of the defense budget that has not been examined but is
currently receiving increased scrutiny and attention. This
study will provide a comprehensive examination of the issues,
trends and implications of congressional oversight of
strategic sealift.
B. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following research questions are addressed:
1. Have U.S. sealift requirements changed now that the
United States has shifted its military strategy from preparing
for war against another major superpower to preparing for one
or more regional conflicts?
2
.
What are the funding and policy differences between
the Department of Defense and Congress in allocating resources
for strategic sealift.
3 What changes have been made to the defense budget
for strategic sealift since 1981?
4. Is there a difference between the House and the
Senate intervention in the defense budget in the area of
strategic sealift?
5. Is there a difference between the congressional
appropriations and authorization committees' intervention in
the defense budget involving strategic sealift?
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis will be an examination of fiscal oversight of
strategic sealift funding, including changes in the
Administration's proposed budget and changes made in the
congressional budget process. This study will be limited to
the fourteen years of budget actions between FY 1981 and FY
1994.
Strategic sealift includes many elements involved in
deploying a military force in response to a contingency. A
short listing of these elements would include prepositioned
ships, Fast Sealift Ships, U.S. -flagged ships under charter to
the Navy, foreign-flagged ships chartered by the Navy, and
Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships. The majority of the funding
for strategic sealift is contained in the defense budget.
However, funding for the maintenance and upkeep of the RRF
ships and limited ship acquisition funding is currently
requested by the President in the budget for the Department of
Transportation and authorized and appropriated in the budget
for the Department of Commerce. This occurs since control of
the Maritime Administration was shifted from the Department of
Commerce to the Department of Transportation in the early
1980 's. For the purposes of this thesis, only funding for
strategic sealift contained in the defense budget will be
examined. This funding will be referred to as the "strategic
sealift program" because the Department of the Navy manages
the funding through their Strategic Sealift Division
(N-42) .
The funds allocated to the RRF are not specifically
examined in this thesis. This is done to avoid the
complexities involved with analyzing differing policy and
resource allocation viewpoints of both the Department of
Transportation and the Department of Defense. Also, it avoids
further complications in the already difficult task of
analyzing the myriad of differing philosophies, concerns and
personalities of the congressional committees involved (i.e.,
the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries in the House and the
Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation in the Senate versus the House and
Senate Armed Services Committees) . Although there are some
different motivating factors, many of the factors influencing
congressional oversight in the RRF program are the same as
those affecting the strategic sealift program.
D . METHODOLOGY
This thesis will examine the scope and nature of
congressional changes to the administration's budget request
for elements of strategic sealift. Data was taken from the
Department of Defense Comptroller's Office, along with
congressional reports displaying adjustments to the budget
request made by authorizing, appropriating and conference
committees of the House and Senate. This information provides
answers to the research questions surrounding fiscal oversight
and budgetary control of strategic sealift.
Congressional hearings, Department of Defense policy
documents and studies, government correspondence, journal
articles and interviews with knowledgeable government
officials are used to document the policy and perspectives on
strategic sealift. This information will address the research
questions concerning resource and policy differences between
and within the Department of Defense and Congress.
E. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II, "Background and History of Strategic Sealift,
"
will define strategic sealift and identify the various
elements that make up the strategic sealift program. It also
provides a background of the elements comprising military
sealift and a recent history of the events and developments
affecting strategic sealift. The importance of sealift for
the National Security Strategy of the United States is also
addressed.
Chapter III, "The Scope of Congressional Oversight of the
Strategic Sealift Program, " addresses congressional oversight
responsibilities and the strategic sealift budget. Spending
trends and categories of the final budget amount appropriated
for the strategic sealift program will be examined with
respect to the administration's budget request.
Chapter IV, "The Differences in Congressional Intervention
in the Strategic Sealift Program, " details the various
approaches and ideas for providing resources to the strategic
sealift program. The committees within Congress holding
oversight responsibility for the strategic sealift program
will be identified. The differences between the approaches
taken by the Authorization and Appropriations committees are
identified and discussed. In addition, the differences
between Senate and House budget actions are examined.
Chapter V, "The Nature of Congressional Intervention in
the Strategic Sealift Program, " examines the type of changes
implemented into the strategic sealift program over time. The
philosophies, issues and possible influential factors
surrounding the views of both the Defense Department and
Congress toward strategic sealift are reviewed.
Chapter VI, "Conclusions," summarizes the findings and
analysis addressed in previous chapters. Trends are
identified and implications drawn. In addition, a program
status report and areas for further research are offered.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF STRATEGIC SEALIFT
The National Security Sealift Policy states, "The United
States' national sealift objective is to ensure that
sufficient military and civilian maritime resources will be
available to meet defense deployment, and essential economic
requirements in support of our national security
policy. " [Ref . 1]
Strategic Sealift is the shipping capacity needed to
deploy a military force to an area in response to a
contingency. Strategic sealift consists of two elements,
surge sealift and sustainment sealift. Surge sealift is the
initial transportation of troops, equipment, ammunition and
supplies to an area in response to a war or other contingency.
Sustainment sealift is the follow-on movement of materials to
support the deployed forces
.
Strategic sealift has been an issue of great concern and
under heavy scrutiny since the early 1980' s. This concern was
caused by the declining size of the U.S. merchant marine
fleet, the growing strength of the Soviet military and crises
that developed in remote areas of the world. Although the
threat posed by the Soviet Union has been virtually
eliminated, the declining size of the merchant fleet and the
need to respond to regional crises are still subject to much
discussion. While all parties will agree that there is a
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requirement for strategic sealift to satisfy the objectives of
our National Security Strategy, the amount, structure, timing
and methods of obtaining sealift capacity have generated much
debate within the Department of Defense, the White House and
the halls of Congress.
A. OBJECTIVES OF STRATEGIC SEALIFT
The demise of the global threat posed by the Soviet Union
has brought about a shift in the National Security Strategy of
the United States. The threat that defined the size,
structure, strategy, tactics and positioning of our defense
forces has been eliminated. Without another superpower to
challenge the sovereignty of the nation, a large military
force is no longer necessary. Instead of a strategy designed
to contain a specific threat from communist expansion in
Europe, the new strategy focuses on the capability to meet
regional challenges and opportunities. According to the
National Military Strategy,
The growing complexity of the international security
environment makes it increasingly difficult to predict the
circumstances under which U.S. military power might be
employed. Hence, forward presence and crisis response are




Although the fundamental elements of the National Defense
Strategy (strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence,
crisis response and reconstitution) remain intact, budgetary
pressures have shifted the priorities among the elements.
Declining budgets have prompted the withdrawal of military
forces homeported overseas and a transition from a reliance on
forward presence towards a new emphasis on crisis response.
In the same manner, scarce financial resources have produced
a decline in defense spending that supports the industrial
base and greater concerns about the reconstitution ability of
the nation. Crisis Response and Reconstitution are two key
elements of our National Security Strategy drawing
considerable attention and resources
.
1. Crisis Response
The ability to respond to a crisis is dependent not
only on structuring highly mobile military forces but having
the capacity to rapidly transport these forces anywhere in the
world. The ability to transport troops, equipment, ammunition
and supplies, called "strategic mobility, " involves a
combination of strategic sealift (including afloat
prepositioning) and strategic airlift. The National Military
Strategy of the United States avers, "The United States
requires sufficient strategic mobility to rapidly deploy and
sustain overwhelming combat power in any region where U.S.
national interests are threatened.
"
[Ref . 3] Of the two
elements of strategic mobility, strategic sealift carries the
vast majority of the assets requiring lift. Strategic airlift
has the capability to move men and some materials very rapidly
but is unable to carry the volume of cargo and equipment that
make up a combat force. For example, in Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, sealift moved 85 percent of dry cargo
and, including petroleum products, sealift carried 95 percent
of everything that was carried to the Persian Gulf. [Ref . 4]
To further emphasize the importance of sealift,
although the U.S. maintains a sizeable peacetime military
presence, more than three-quarters of America's land combat
power still resides in the United States.
In a major conventional conflict, the preponderance of
America's combat units will have to be transported across
vast expanses of water to arrive at the scene of the
fighting. Once there, they will have to be supported by
a logistics train extending back across those waters to
the U.S. industrial base. [Ref. 5]
It is obvious that the major objective of strategic sealift is
to satisfy the crisis response segment of the National
Security Strategy.
2. Reconstitution
Another objective of strategic sealift involves the
preservation of the reconstitution element of the National
Security Strategy. The nation's industrial base is a major
factor in being able to recreate a global warfighting
capability. Investment in strategic sealift is vital to the
maintenance of the nation's defense industrial base. This is
especially true in this area of declining defense budgets and
force downsizing. The reduction in the number of naval
combatants being constructed has significantly curtailed the
economic activity of U.S. shipyards. The nation must now look
10
to utilize limited defense funding to preserve the unique
military research, development and manufacturing capacity of
defense industries to ensure they are available if necessary.
With fewer defense dollars in the marketplace, the country's
defense industrial base is losing the capacity to rapidly
reconstruct the nation's military machinery in a time of war.
Especially vulnerable is the nation's capacity to
build and repair ships. As then Secretary of the Navy H.
Lawrence Garrett III pointed out in testimony before Congress,
I remark to people the story of the battleships. People
ask why don't we scrap them. One of the points I make is
even if you wanted to, you couldn't build a battleship in
this nation today. That industrial capacity is
gone. [Ref . 6]
Investments in strategic sealift provide valuable financial
support to the country's shipbuilding industry.
Strategic sealift is vital to the interests of this
country. Maintaining the ability to rapidly deploy a military
force gives America the capability to respond to a crisis
anywhere in the world to meet national interests. Continual
investment in strategic sealift helps maintain the industrial
base necessary for reconstitution of the armed forces in time
of war or other emergency. The ability to simultaneously
satisfy two of the principle objectives of our National
Security Strategy with one investment action will become an
important factor when examining congressional interest in the
area of strategic sealift.
11
B. ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC SEALIFT
Budgets supporting strategic sealift have been changing
significantly the past fourteen years, both in size and
content. In order to understand the importance and
consequences of the budget changes during this timeframe, it




1. The National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF)
The NDRF is divided into two components. The first
component is the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) which includes 96
ships. The 96 ships include 46 cargo ships of various types,
2 9 vehicle cargo ships, 11 tankers, 8 crane ships and 2 troop
ships. These ships are laid up and routinely maintained so
that they can be activated in 5, 10 or 2 days. The RRF ships
are currently under the control of the Department of
Transportation, Maritime Administration (MARAD) although in
the past they were managed by the U.S. Navy. When needed,
these ships have to be towed to repair facilities for
activation and are then manned by personnel drawn from the
merchant marine. Also, they are occasionally activated for
training exercises and readiness testing and are periodically
overhauled.
The other component of the NDRF consists of 116 ships,
71 Victory-class ships built during World War II and 45 other
ships of varying types and ages. These ships receive very
12
little maintenance and would require between 30-120 days of
repair before they would be ready for activation. These ships
are also controlled by MARAD
.
The NDRF is located mainly in three sites: James
River, VA; Beaumont, TX; and Suisan Bay, CA. Ships in the RRF
are located at those sites also, but there are also some RRF
ships outported in various other ports throughout the
continental United States. In the event of a crisis, MARAD
would activate ships as ordered by the Department of Defense
and then transfer them to the jurisdiction of the military.
Congress provides funding for the NDRF through the Department
of Transportation's budget but the Navy provides the military
requirements that determine the numbers and types of ships and
their readiness status.
2. Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)
There are currently 13 ships that comprise the MPS
fleet. These 13 ships support the early deployment of Marine
Corps forces . They are divided into three squadrons located
on the East Coast of the United States, Diego Garcia and Guam.
They are fully manned and operated by commercial firms under
charter to the Navy and each squadron carries the equipment
and 3 days of supplies for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
The MPS program is designed to allow Marines to be flown into
an area and then "marry up" with the equipment and supplies
carried by the MPS ships. The ships can sail on a day's
13
notice and after delivering their prepositioned cargo, are
available for additional sealift missions.
3. Afloat Prepositioning Ships (APS)
The APS fleet consists of 12 ships. These 12 ships
carry generic supplies, fuel, ammunition and port operating
equipment for U.S. Navy and Air Force forces. The APS ships
are designed to provide initial supplies to deployed forces to
carry them through the initial stages of the contingency until
the sustainment sealift becomes available. They are based in
Diego Garcia, although one ship is usually stationed in the
Mediterranean. They are manned and operated by commercial
firms under charter to the Navy. Like the MPSs, the APSs can
sail on a day's notice. They are also available for
additional duty once they have delivered their prepositioned
cargo
.
4. Fast Sealift Ships (FSS)
The United States maintains eight Fast Sealift Ships.
These 8 ships are large and capable of a maximum speed of
about 30 knots. They are designed to carry the unit equipment
and supplies for an entire mechanized division. The ships are
berthed in ports on both coasts of the United States. They
are partially manned and are maintained in a reduced operating
status with a readiness to sail within four days. Because of
their speed, they are expected to make multiple deliveries
during the course on an operation.
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5. Aviation Logistics Support Ships (T-AVB)
These two specialty ships are designed primarily for
providing a mobile intermediate maintenance capacity for U.S.
Marine Corps helicopters involved in contingency operations.
These ships are maintained in a five day readiness status and
can house an aircraft maintenance detachment of approximately
350 people. If their aviation maintenance equipment is
offloaded, these ships can be used to make further cargo
deliveries
.
6. Hospital Ships (T-AH)
These two converted tankers are located on opposite
coasts and serve as floating hospitals for the military. They
are equipped with 1,000 beds, have 12 operating rooms and can
house a medical staff of about 950 people.
7. Auxiliary Crane Ships (T-ACS)
There are eight of these ships designed to unload
other ships at anchorage when ports are not available or to
unload ships when existing ports possess little or no
offloading capability.
8. Commercial U.S. Flag Vessels
These ships are owned by U.S. companies and can be
chartered in time of need. However, the availability of these
ships is difficult to predict since some firms may be
reluctant to disrupt ships maintaining designated routes for
fear of losing long term customers. The U.S. may also call up
15
conimercial ships designated as members of the Sealift
Readiness Program (SRP) . Companies that wish to carry
Department of Defense cargo as part of. their normal business
must commit at least half of their ships to the SRP. In
addition, all shipping companies that compete for Department
of Defense cargo must commit half of their ships to the SRP.
There are 93 ships designated in the SRP program.
9 . Foreign Flagged Ships
These ships can be chartered from the open market
although the availability and positioning of these ships in a
constrained timeframe is uncertain.
10 . Amphibious Equipment and Programs
There are a variety of other elements that are not
sealift ships but can be included in the category of strategic
sealift. These complementary programs directly support
sealift objectives and are managed in coordination with the
sealift fleet assets. An example of one of the complementary
programs is the Cargo Offload and Discharge System (COLDS)
which includes the Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS)
.
This program is designed to allow fuel and other cargo to
reach deployed troops located in an area with inadequate port
facilities. The Merchant Ship Naval Auxiliary Program (MSNAP)
is a research and development program conducting studies of
methods to help commercial ships and crews adapt to the
special needs and requirements of strategic sealift missions.
16
The Sealift Enhancement program provides equipment and
modifications ( including Seasheds , Flatracks and Containership
Cargo Storage Adapters (CCSA) ) to merchant ships so that they
can handle military cargo.
C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF STRATEGIC SEALIFT
1. History
The United States exists as an island nation due to
both geographical and economic considerations. America is
dependent on the trading nations of the world and on the
uninhibited use of the seas for commerce. Due to these
considerations, the United States has maintained a long
history of maritime strength since the arrival of the Pilgrims
at Plymouth Rock. Shipping and trade routes have always been
vital to America and the nation's merchant marine fleet grew
strong through international commerce. In the mid-1800 's,
America emerged as one of the dominant maritime powers of the
world.
The country emerged from World War II with a huge
commercial fleet. From the military viewpoint, the United
States was both a military superpower and a maritime giant.
There was little reason to question the availability of
sealift assets in a time of need and strategic sealift was
given scant attention by military leaders. But in the later
half of the twentieth century, foreign competition and
government regulation eroded the size of the U.S merchant
17
marine fleet. As Table I clearly shows, the size of the
commercially owned U.S. flagged fleet dramatically declined in
just a twenty year period.
TABLE I
PRIVATELY-OWNED U.S. -FLAG MILITARILY-USEFUL DRY-CARGO FLEET




Source: Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense, "Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Sealift Performance and Future
Sealift Requirements", Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Merchant Marine of the Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, House of Representatives, p. 24, April 23, 1991
2. Removal of Government Subsidies
Another factor that had a profound impact on the U.S.
merchant marine fleet was the elimination of government
subsidies for the commercial shipyards and shipping companies.
As pressure to balance the federal budget mounted during the
early 1980 's, support for large scale subsidies to domestic
industries waned in Congress. The construction differential
subsidy for shipyards and new contracts for the operating
differential subsidy for shipping firms were eliminated in
1982 . There are some operating differential subsidy contracts
that will not expire until 1997. Without the subsidies,
American firms were at a competitive disadvantage in the world
market
.
The effect of the removal of construction differential
subsidies on private U.S. shipyards was substantial. The
number of shipyards declined from 110 in 1980 to only 60
shipyards in 1990. In the same timeframe, the number of
production workers fell from a level of 112,000 workers to
approximately 72,000. Even more enlightening, in 1976 U.S.
shipyards had 155 vessels under construction, with almost 50
percent of those ships going to commercial customers . By
1993, there were only four commercial vessels under
construction in the country
.
[Ref . 8] As John Stocker,
President of the Shipbuilders Council of America testified,
Shipbuilding in the United States has, for all practical
purposes, only one customer -- the U.S. Government,
principally the U.S. Navy. Over 90 percent of our
workload is derived from Navy contracts for new
construction and repair. [Ref. 9]
The future loss of the operating differential
subsidies is just as significant. Foreign flag vessels do not
have to operate under the higher safety standards, manning
requirements, wage scales and tax structure intrinsic to U.S.
flag vessels. Therefore, it is much cheaper to operate a
vessel flagged under a foreign country. The loss of operating
subsidies is one factor that led to a decline in the number of
U.S. flagged ships. Another factor was the transition by
shipping companies to larger container ships, resulting in
fewer ships and a smaller merchant marine force to man these
ships. These factors resulted in a reduction in the demand
for U.S. seafarers and a decline in the available merchant
19
mariner manpower pool. In 1980, the number of available
merchant mariners in the U.S. was approximately 48,000. By
1985 it had fallen to 30,000 and in 1990 it numbered 25,000.
MARAD anticipates a further decline to approximately 11,000
merchant mariners by the turn of the
century
.
[Ref . 10] This was most evident in Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm when there was a severe strain on
the manpower pool when vessels in the RRF were activated and
the mariner unions had to scramble to find available men to
man the ships
.
3 . International Events
Along with the concern over the declining U.S.
maritime industry, several events in the late 1970 's and early
1980 's raised congressional and military interest in strategic
sealift. The recognition by the U.S. that the Soviet Union
had achieved nuclear parity led to a refocusing of military
planning. Military strategists were forced to consider
scenarios reflecting long term conventional warfare in Europe,
with a resulting requirement for more sealift capacity. In
addition, the Soviet navy had grown increasingly powerful,
operating more frequently in the open areas of the world.
This not only challenged America's maritime dominance but also
raised the specter of Soviet intervention in distant areas or
the possible impediment to free trade. America started
realizing that the military needed the capability to swiftly
20
move forces to an unexpected sector of the globe to counter a
rising Soviet maritime force.
During the same time period, the Iranian revolution,
the seizure of U.S. hostages in Iran, and the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan demonstrated to leaders in the U.S. that
military crises can develop rapidly, without warning or time
for military force build-ups. These events led to the Defense
Department's creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
(RDJTF) in 1981. The RDJTF was envisioned as a separate
unified command that could respond quickly to a contingency
anywhere in the world. But it was the concept of rapid
deployment that altered both the military and congressional
outlook on strategic sealif t
.
[Ref . 11]
4 . Industry Trends
Another phenomenon raising congressional awareness
involved a growing shift in the merchant marine industry away
from military useful breakbulk ships and small tankers. The
new trend of building commercially efficient container ships
and large tankers reduced the number of ships that could be
used by the military for strategic sealif t. The Defense
Department was faced with either producing ships designed and
operated solely for military use, purchasing and maintaining
used commercial ships, or somehow adapting the new
commercially designed ships to fit their needs. Each of the
options resulted in a substantial cost to the Defense
21
Department for strategic sealift capacity that had, in the
past, been satisfied by a reliance on the strength of the U.S.
maritime industry.
5. Government Actions
Congress intervened in the strategic sealift issue by
ordering the Department of Defense in the FY 1981 Defense
Authorization Act to complete an analysis of sealift
requirements. This resulted in the Defense Department's
publication of the Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study
(CMMS) . This was followed by the DoD Sealift Study completed
by the Pentagon in 1984. Both of these studies indicated that
the militarily useful ships in the merchant marine would no
longer support our national security needs. These two
documents were the justification for the strategic sealift
programs that followed throughout the 1980's. These studies
also prompted the Department of the Navy to add strategic
sealift as a third major mission of their service (in addition
to sea control and power projection) in 1984. Later in the
year, the Strategic Sealift Division (N-42) was created within
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to provide an
advocate for strategic sealift.
The last major event that profoundly affected
strategic sealift was the establishment and subsequent
enhancement of the Ready Reserve Fleet. The Merchant Ship
Sales Act of 1946 created the National Defense Reserve Fleet,
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a pool of inactive but potentially useful cargo ships. This
pool of ships was used in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, but by
the mid-1970 's, most of the ships in the fleet were over 3
years old. MARAD and the Navy grew concerned about the
ability to activate these aging ships. In 1976, the two
signed a Memorandum of Understanding to provide for an
upgrading of a portion of the NDRF . These upgraded ships were
called the Ready Reserve Fleet.
Although MARAD owned and operated the RRF, funding for
the program was provided solely by the Navy from FY 1977 until
FY 1988. During this eleven year period, the Navy supplied
$1.1 billion dollars to MARAD for ship acquisitions and the
operations and maintenance of the existing fleet. In FY 1989,
Congress started appropriating funds for the RRF directly to
MARAD. Although Congress appropriated nearly the same amount
requested in the President's budget every year, there was one
noteworthy exception. In FY 1990, MARAD requested $23 9
million dollars for the RRF, including $123 million for
operations and maintenance activities. Congress appropriated
only $89 million including $29.5 million for operations and
maintenance. This funding deficiency proved to be significant
during the breakout of RRF ships for Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm. [Ref. 12]
The RRF would become an important portion of strategic
sealift and the Navy would later point to the RRF to answer
any critics questioning sealift capacity throughout the
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1980's. Congress provided funding to expand the RRF in the
early 1980's and this fact would influence the debate on
strategic sealift for the remainder of. the decade.
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III. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE STRATEGIC SEALIFT
PROGRAM
This chapter will examine the annual review of the
strategic sealift program portion of the defense budget by
Congress. The first section will address the structure of
congressional oversight as it pertains to the strategic
sealift budget. Next, the tools available for use in the
oversight process will de addressed. The third section
analyzes trends in congressional oversight during the period
FY 1981-FY 1994. The final section looks at the establishment
of the National Defense Sealift Fund as a major event
affecting congressional oversight of the strategic sealift
program.
A. STRUCTURE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
The Department of Defense's organization and planning
structure is organized to submit a budget every two years as
part of the President's budget request. Although formally set
up under a biannual budgeting system, Congress has never
approved the second year of any two year budget submission.
Instead, an amended budget is submitted for the second year
and that is the budget reviewed by Congress.
The defense budget and related legislation is both
authorized and appropriated every year. Oversight of the
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budget occurs within the committees responsible for defense
matters. The authorizing committees are the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees. While the authorization process
does not provide any spending authority, these committees
delineate the nature of defense spending and prescribe amounts
that Congress can appropriate for each specific program.
The Subcommittees on Defense of the Appropriations
Committees in both the House and the Senate hold jurisdiction
over defense spending amounts. Appropriation bills provide
actual authority to incur obligations and make payments out of
the U.S. Treasury. It is within these four committees that
oversight of the defense budget, and therefore the strategic
sealift budget, occurs.
It should also be noted that both appropriation and
authorization bills ultimately are reconciled in conference
committees and then put to a vote on the respective floors of
both chambers. Although primary oversight of the defense
budget is completed within the committees, changes in the
bills can be and are often made on the floor of each chamber
and in conference committees.
B. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PROCESS
Congress has a variety of tools to use in the oversight
process of the strategic sealift budget. Congress routinely
holds hearings to discuss significant items or portions of the
defense budget. The congressional committees have staff
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members to gather and study information relevant to the
committee's jurisdiction. Congress can use legislation within
the budget bills or report language to direct actions of the
military or provide guidance. Also, the structuring of the
budget items within the bill can provide guidance to the
Defense Department.
Hearings are held to elicit the positions and views of the
senior civilian and military leaders within the Department of
Defense and the Department of the Navy. The hearings are a
forum where members of Congress can question the leaders about
important issues that interest them or to question the
justification for certain programs. The hearings also present
an opportunity for congressional members to present their
views and express their priorities to military officials.
The congressional committees have staff members assigned
to them to help the committee members deal with the
complexities and details of the defense budget. These
professionals are experts in designated areas of the defense
budget and work closely with defense officials to provide
information and monitoring of defense programs. Each of the
four committees providing oversight to the defense budget has
professional staff members that include strategic sealift as
one of their areas of expertise. The committee members use
the professional staff as a tool to provide oversight on areas
of the defense budget that interest them.
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Another tool at the disposal of the Congress is report or
study requirements and a "Sense of the Congress" decree. The
committees can write legislation or reports requiring the
military to prepare and submit reports to Congress on selected
items or programs. Putting the requirement to submit a study
into statutory law is a compelling tool for the conduct of
congressional oversight. A "Sense of the Congress" decree is
a method that clearly states and puts on public record the
desires of Congress on a particular issue.
The last tool available to Congress for budgetary
oversight is the form and structure of the authorization and
appropriation bills. Congress has structured the defense
bills so that the Defense Department must spend the funds
allocated to them as prescribed by Congress. Although there
is some room for adjustments by defense officials within
categories, for the most part money must be obligated for the
purposes written into the defense bills. A specific example
of this is evident in the Ship Construction, Navy (SCN)
portion of the defense budget. Congress has structured this
account so that each line item is an individual appropriation.
Any attempt to reprogram funds within this account must be
approved by Congress. This tool ensures that the will of
Congress expressed in the authorization and appropriation
process is maintained during the execution process.
This chapter and the next two chapters will discuss the
use of these tools by Congress in the area of strategic
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sealift during the oversight of and intervention into the
defense budget
.
C. CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION IN THE STRATEGIC SEALIFT BUDGET
The rest of this chapter discusses the overall level of
intervention by Congress into the strategic sealift budget.
Specifically, this analysis examines the changes made to the
President's budget request for strategic sealift during the
course of providing final appropriations by Congress between
FY 1981 and FY 1994. The purpose of this analysis is to
highlight funding and policy differences between Congress and
the Department of Defense in allocating resources
.
The data used in the analysis is provided by the
Comptroller of the Department of Defense and the congressional
reports issued as a result of the budget process.
This analysis divides the fourteen fiscal years into three
periods. The first period is FY 1981 to FY 1985. This period
shows the initial investment efforts in strategic sealift in
response to the Soviet military build-up and events in the
Middle East. The second period is FY 1986 to FY 1989. The
budgets in the second period reflect the realization of the
decline of the U.S. merchant fleet and the deterioration of
the defense industrial base for shipyards, a growing concern
for the sealift capacity shortage and efforts to correct these
problems. The third period is FY 1990 to FY 1994. This
timeframe is monopolized by the events surrounding Operation
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Desert Shield/Desert Storm. These periods help frame the
strategic sealift budget trends and provide a structure for
examining congressional oversight and intervention.
1. Broad Trends In Strategic Sealift
Congressional intervention into the strategic sealift
budget during the period FY 1981-1994 was significant. This
is especially obvious when the broad trends affecting the
defense budget over this period are analyzed.
During this span, Congress reduced the total
Department of Defense budget request in 12 of the 14 years.
The average reduction during the period was 3.5 percent. In
contrast, Congress increased the budget request for strategic
sealift in 9 of the fourteen years, with an average increase
of 87.7 percent. In the last five years alone, Congress
nearly doubled the Pentagon's funding requests for sealift,
adding over $2.2 billion to enhance sealift capacity.
The priority of funding for strategic sealift was also
raised during each of the time period analyzed in the fourteen
year time span. In the first period, the funds appropriated
for sealift averaged .178 percent of the entire DoD budget.
The second period yielded an average of. 193 percent of the
total DoD budget and this increased to an average of .348
percent during the third period. [Ref. 13]
These broads trends in the budget for strategic
sealift show significant congressional intervention and an
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increase in the priority of sealift within the total DoD
budget. The following sections describe the type, size and
nature of congressional oversight of the strategic sealift
budget
.
2. The Initial Investment in Strategic Sealift: FY 1981-
85
In response to events in Iran and the growing naval
fleet of the Soviet Union, the Department of Defense looked
for some solutions to the immediate need for strategic
sealift. In particular, the Pentagon concentrated on solving
the sealift capacity required to support the RDJTF concept.
The period between FY 1981-FY 1985 revealed a Congress that
fully supported the need for more sealift capacity but
differed on the approach and concepts put forward by the
military. In addition, Congress attempted to force the
military to use funds for sealift efficiently by threatening
to withhold them. The President's budget for FY 1981 included
a request for $2 07 million to construct two MPS ships for the
RDJTF. Although Congress supported the concept of the MPS, it
felt that this was an inadequate attempt to satisfy an urgent
need. Instead of funding the MPS, Congress appropriated $318
million to modify eight SL-7 container ships for military use.
Congress felt that its initiative was a more timely and cost
effective alternative to the strategic sealift problem.
The following fiscal year provided another example of
congressional intervention into the strategic sealift budget.
31
The Defense Department displayed a strong commitment to
strategic sealift by requesting $1.1384 billion worth of
programs in the FY 1982 budget. These programs included
purchasing MPS equipment, constructing MPS container and Roll
On/Roll Off (RO/RO) ships, a purchase and conversion program
for MPS's, and some long lead time procurement for a hospital
ship. Later in the year, the military altered its sealift
capacity strategy and decided to cancel the proposed
construction of the MPS ships and instead moved to a buyMease
program for the FSS's.
Congress did not fully agree with the new direction of
the Pentagon and consequently funded less than a third of the
request. Congress appropriated $307.6 million to fund the
buy/lease program for the FSS's, citing uncertainty and
limited justification for the buy/lease aspects of the
program.
The same trend continued in both FY 1983 and FY 1984.
The Department of Defense requested $662.6 and $907.8 million
for those years and received $344 and $838.6 million
respectively. Congress alluded to insufficient program
justification and inefficient programs to deny funding for the
strategic programs in these years.
The same pattern was evident in FY 1985 but Congress
also added some resources to fix problems that it observed.
Congress added $5 million to the budget to pay for the
dispersal of RRF ships. A report by the House Appropriations
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Committee staff showed that the shipyards in the vicinity of
the three main RRF sites would be saturated in the event of a
major mobilization. The additional funding would pay for the
transfer of several ships to alternative ports. Congress also
added $27.2 million to fund the transportation, loading and
reconfiguration costs for the delivery of the first and second
MPS increments
.
The initial investment period reflects numerous
disagreements between the Department of Defense and Congress
in terms of funding priorities for strategic sealift.
Although both sides showed some desire to enhance strategic
sealift capacity, they could not agree on a unified approach
to solve the problems . The Pentagon was given an opportunity
to study the problem and to complete the Congressionally
Mandated Mobility Study and the DoD Sealift Study (both
discussed earlier) . The period also produced several viable
acquisition programs and some advances in sealift capacity.
The Pentagon viewed this period as a significant investment in
strategic sealift and substantial progress to solve an
evolving problem. Congress viewed this same period with some
frustration at what it perceived as inadequate efforts by the
military and a shortage of sealift capacity that was not being
solved very quickly.
3. Decline and Renewal: FY 1986-89
In this period, Congress and the Department of Defense
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displayed similar approaches to the strategic sealift issue.
Both parties attempted to adopt solutions to rectify the
identified shortages in sealift capacity. These solutions
were based on the findings of the Congressionally Mandated
Mobility Study and the DoD Sealift Study. The trend of
congressional intervention in the period was to provide slight
increases in funding to the amounts requested in the
President's budget for projects deemed worthy. Overall,
Congress tended to support the concepts put forward by the
Defense Department and promote specific areas of concern.
The Defense Department requested $1,159 billion in FY
1986 for strategic sealift programs and Congress appropriated
$1,191 billion. Most of this money went for the maintenance
and upkeep of the RRF ships bought in previous years, but
funds were also allocated to purchase additional RRF ships,
convert three T-ACS crane ships and one T-AVB aviation
logistics ship, and purchase more sealift support equipment.
Although Congress lowered the amount of funding for the
conversion of the crane ships by $8.5 million due to lower
contracts negotiated for previous conversions, they included
an extra $25 million to buy more ships for the RRF and $12
million to buy more Seasheds in the Sealift Support Equipment
program.
In FY 1987, the President's budget requested $205.2
million for strategic sealift programs and Congress
appropriated $244.3 million. Congress removed $20.7 million
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requested for the Sealift Enhancement program on grounds of
insufficient planning by the Navy, but added money for several
other programs. Once again Congress provided an extra $50
million for the purchase of RRF ships and $12 million to buy
more Seasheds . There was another $3,855 million provided for
dredging operations at James River, VA and Beaumont, TX to
restore adequate access for ships of the NDRF.
Congress was a bit less generous in FY 1988, with the
Department of Defense requesting $719 million and Congress
slightly lowering that total to $712.4 million. This
reduction was mainly due to the second denial of funds for the
Sealift Enhancement program, a $17.8 million line item.
Congress added $12 million to procure more Seasheds.
In FY 1989, the Defense Department's investment in
strategic sealift was reduced significantly. The President's
budget request included only $37.2 million for strategic
sealift. Although Congress included some discussion of the
continuing serious shortage of sealift capacity, there was
very little intervention into the program. Instead, Congress
nearly doubled the request, adding $20 million to obtain more
Seasheds and $15 million to continue funding a new program
within the Amphibious Equipment line item, the Offshore
Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS)
.
During this period, Congress and the Pentagon
maintained similar views on the amount and type of resources
needed for the strategic sealift program. Although Congress
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expressed some dissatisfaction at the progress of the military
in solving the shortage of sealift capacity, there was strong
support for DoD budget requests intended to solve the problem.
4. The Impact of Desert Shield/Desert Storm: FY 1990-94
This interval was dominated by the events surrounding
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. It also marked the most
serious confrontation between Congress and the Department of
Defense over the allocation of resources for strategic
sealift. While Congress appropriated large sums of money in
an attempt to bring quick solutions to the now clearly defined
shortages of sealift capacity, the Pentagon took a more
cautious approach and looked to better define the amount and
type of sealift capacity needed in a changing world. This
divergence of views resulted in substantial adjustments to the
defense budget by Congress.
The year preceding the Persian Gulf conflict, Congress
began a remarkable trend of intervention into the defense
budget to promote strategic sealift. The President's budget
requested $448.6 million the majority of which would fund the
operation and maintenance of the existing sealift assets.
Congress, expressing great dissatisfaction with the lack of
initiative in solving the persistent deficiency in mobility
lift capacity, added $600 million to buy strategic sealift
ships to partially redress the issue. Congress intended this
appropriation as the first step in a continuing effort to
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solve the problem and urged the Navy to include requests for
at least three more fast sealift ships annually. Congress
provided an additional $16 million to purchase more amphibious
equipment (OPDS systems) and also initiated a $15 million
appropriation for Enhanced Fast Sealift Technologies Research.
Congressional intervention into the FY 1990 defense budget
more than doubled the Defense Department's allocation of
resources to strategic sealift.
This posture continued in FY 1991. The Department of
Defense budget request was slightly higher than the previous
year, $485.9 million, and was devoted to the same programs.
The congressional response, fueled by Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait on 2 August 199 0, was more dramatic. Congress
appropriated an additional $40 million for the readiness of
existing strategic sealift assets, $900 million for the
purchase of sealift ships, and $3.4 million for the second
year of the Enhance Sealift Technologies Research Program.
This action by Congress almost tripled the amount requested by
the President. Even though the budget process for FY 1992 was
nearing completion when Saddam Hussein's troops marched across
the Kuwait border, the early results of the mobilization of
U.S. forces revealed a significant shortage of strategic
sealift
.
The Department of Defense budget submission for FY
1992 included only $88 million for strategic sealift programs,
$86 million for amphibious equipment and $1.9 million for the
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Merchant Ship Naval Augmentation Program (MSNAP) , a program
that develops prototype systems that enable civilian merchant
ships to perform tasks in support of the strategic sealift
mission.
Once again, the trend of congressional increases was
evident. Congress added $30 million for the operation and
maintenance of sealift programs, a substantial $600 million
for the procurement of more sealift ships, an extra $6 million
to buy another OPDS system and $3 million to explore a new
program, Mobile Offshore Basing Analysis, which is an
extension of the maritime prepositioning concept. These
congressional initiatives provided almost a billion dollars
extra to the strategic sealift budget, more than eight times
the amount originally requested in the President's budget.
Fiscal Year 1993 produced a short reversal in the
trend of this period, with the Pentagon requesting a larger
budget than Congress was willing to support. The President's
budget request included $1,203 million for the purchase of
amphibious equipment and a huge $1.2014 billion to place in a
new financial vehicle, the National Defense Sealift Fund
(NDSF) . Congress urged DoD to use funds unobligated from
previous years for the NDSF, appropriating only $613.4 million
for the NDSF and added $22 million to the amphibious equipment
line item for more OPDS systems. Also, Congress provided $7
million to further explore the Mobile Offshore Basing Program
and added $13.4 million to research Sealift Ship Technology
initiatives that provide dual use for both the military and
commercial sectors
.
In total, Congress appropriated only $657.5 million
for FY 1993, approximately half of what the Defense Department
requested. But, the cut in the request was less significant
than the establishment of the NDSF, an initiative that would
dramatically alter the future of strategic sealift. This
event is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
The final year of this period showed the Pentagon
requesting $293.4 million for strategic sealift, consisting of
$290.8 million for the NDSF and $2.6 million under the
Amphibious Equipment heading. Congress inserted an additional
$507.7 million for the readiness of existing sealift assets,
an extra $1,250 billion for the NDSF, $17 million to fund the
Mobile Offshore Basing Analysis and $38.75 million to fund the
establishment of a Maritime Technology Office, an agency that
would fund a variety of research into maritime improvements.
The additional $1,250 billion appropriated to the NDSF
was not intended for strategic sealift programs. Rather, $1.2
billion is meant to fund an aircraft carrier not yet
authorized, with the remaining $50 million for loan guarantees
for the shipbuilding industry. This leaves $290 million for
sealift, the same as the administration requested. Thus
congressional intervention into the defense budget in FY 1994
provided a funding level for strategic sealift (excluding the
funds for the aircraft carrier and loan guarantees) of $349.2
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million, 50 percent above the original budget request.
The period of FY 1990 through FY 19 94 was
characterized by significant differences in the approach to
resource allocation for strategic sealift between the Defense
Department and Congress. Congress was dissatisfied with the
progress of the military in solving an identified shortage in
strategic sealift pointed out as early as 1981 in the
Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study and later verified by
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Congress responded by
initiating large increases to fund strategic sealift programs.
The Department of Defense assumed a more cautious
approach during this period. Rather than requesting funding
for programs that may not solve the sealift capacity shortage
in an efficient manner, the Pentagon decided to await the
results of a new study started by the military in 1990, the
Mobility Requirements Study. Even after the release of Volume
I of the study, the Navy would not obligate the funding
appropriated to procure sealift assets until late 1993. In
the interim, design specifications for the new ships were
drawn up and the NDSF was established as the financial vehicle
for the procurement of strategic sealift ships. The next
section will discuss the establishment of the NDSF in more
detail
.
5 . The Establishment of the National Defense Sealift Fund
The issues surrounding the establishment of the NDSF
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are significant because they involve congressional oversight
responsibility of strategic sealift issues. Specifically, the
implementation of the NDSF removed some congressional control
in the oversight process of strategic sealift. Although the
NDSF gave strategic sealift funding greater visibility in the
defense budget, it also gave the military greater flexibility
in managing the funding for strategic sealift. This approach
caused great concern in Congress, given the significant
differences between the Congress and the military in the area
of strategic sealift.
The NDSF concept was introduced by the Navy in 1991.
The concept was developed by a group comprised of
representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the staff of
the Secretary of Defense, each of the four services, the
Maritime Administration and the staff of the U.S.
Transportation Command. The provisions of the NDSF were
incorporated into the National Defense Sealift Improvement Act
which was forwarded to Congress in 1991 as part of the
President's FY 1993 defense budget request.
The NDSF is structured as a revolving account for
accumulating sealift financial assets. It is a centrally-
managed fund that receives direct appropriations for sealift
ship acquisitions, strategic sealift programs and research
initiatives. Previously, funding for strategic sealift
programs was located in many different accounts throughout the
defense budget. The NDSF can receive revenues and receipts
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from sources such as Allied contributions, sealift user fees,
possible leasing arrangements and the scrap values from
obsolete sealift assets. The fund's expenditures will not
only provide for new sealift ships but will also fund the
operation and maintenance of other sealift assets, invest in
military features for commercial ships and provide funding for
research/development efforts in the strategic sealift arena.
[Ref. 14]
The Navy points out several advantages of implementing
the NDSF. The fund provides higher visibility in the budget
for strategic sealift and it promotes greater program
continuity versus the current annual approach taken by
Congress. The NDSF provides a mechanism to quickly address
sealift needs as markets and threats change. The Navy can
utilize various acquisition sources to ensure the most cost
efficient approach is taken to address sealift priorities.
Also, since the fund can accept revenues, the Navy
sees the NDSF as an opportunity to use commercial business
practices to sustain the fund's assets over time. For
example, sealift assets are usually not required except in
times of emergencies. These assets could be leased out on the
world market to generate revenue while still maintaining short
notice readiness. Another plausible scenario involves the
collection of burdensharing funds by foreign nations or
alliances which may be interested in cooperative arrangements





The disadvantages of the fund, as viewed by Congress,
are the loss of control over the expenditure of funds in the
NDSF . Congress would lose some oversight over the exact size
and nature of the fund's outlays, which can be substantial
sums of money in matters such as ship acquisitions. Congress
was especially wary of such an arrangement in the area of
strategic sealift. The Navy was requesting the establishment
of the NDSF at a time when congressional concerns in this area
had been pushed aside for several years
.
When the NDSF concept was first proposed in 1992, it
received some interest in both the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees, but was rejected by both due to concerns
over oversight responsibilities. As stated in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, "The committee
has reservations about the open-ended nature of this proposal




The Navy continued to lobby Capitol Hill for the
establishment of the NDSF, with the then Secretary of the Navy
Sean O'Keefe becoming an active advocate for the fund. After
some intense negotiations with congressional staff and leaders
over provisions ensuring oversight control of the fund, both
the House and the Senate Appropriation committees appropriated
funds for the NDSF, pending authorization. Secretary O'Keefe
then persuaded Senator John Warner to introduce an amendment
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to the Defense Authorization Act on the floor of the Senate.
After approval of the amendment on the floor and after the
Authorization Conference Committee .approved the Senate
position, the NDSF legislation easily passed through the
remaining congressional process.
The legislation included limiting provisions providing
congressional oversight guidance for use of the fund. An
example of this guidance is contained in the conference report
for the Defense Authorization Act for FY 1993.
Finally, regarding amounts that may be deposited into the
fund in the future, the conferees agree that such amounts
shall be authorized for specific purposes, typically based
on the annual budget request. However, to the extent that
the Secretary should desire a deviation from the plan as
authorized, the conferees direct that such changes shall
be made only after notification to the congressional




The NDSF was initially capitalized with $2,463
billion, mostly made up of prior year appropriations. The
initial funding consisted of the current appropriation for FY
1993 of $612.4 million, $600 million from FY 1992, $900
million from FY 1991, and $350 million from FY 1990. Congress
originally provided $600 million in FY 1990 for strategic
sealift acquisition but the Navy needed these funds late in
the year to cover excess personnel and CHAMPUS costs and $250




The establishment of the NDSF was significant for many
reasons. By consolidating funding from many programs into one
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account, strategic sealift was given higher visibility and
greater prominence in the defense budget. The implementation
of the fund gave the Navy the flexibility to manage sealift
assets like a business, collecting revenues and purchasing
required assets. It also produced a mechanism for quickly
addressing sealift needs as markets and threats change. It
allowed the use of various procurement sources to ensure cost
efficiency in resource allocation. The fund is also intended
to provide greater continuity in the strategic sealift
program. While the establishment of the NDSF produced several
advantages for the Department of Defense and the Navy,




The strategic sealift program is a portion of the defense
budget and is submitted to Congress each year in the
President's budget request. In Congress, the program is
subject to annual review as part of the authorization and
appropriation process. The strategic sealift program must be
authorized and appropriated by the committees in the House and
the Senate responsible for defense oversight. Congress has a
variety of tools for use in the oversight process.
The data indicates that the Department of Defense and
Congress agree that a shortage in sealift capacity existed;
however, they did not agree on the proper allocation of
45
resources to solve the problem. Congressional oversight into
the strategic sealift budget can be broken into three time
periods. The first time period, FY 1981-FY 1985, showed
Congress and the Pentagon failing to develop a unified
approach to solving the sealift capacity shortage, although
some progress was achieved. The second time period, FY 1966-
FY 1989, found both parties sharing similar views and little
intervention into the defense budget by Congress.
Disagreement returned during the third time period, with
Congress appropriating large budgets in an attempt to force
sealift ship procurement while the Defense Department took a
more cautious approach.
This chapter examined the results of congressional
oversight of the strategic sealift. The next chapter will
further explore the congressional oversight process by
reviewing differences between the House and the Senate and the
authorization and appropriation committees.
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IV. THE DIFFERENCES IN CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE
STRATEGIC SEALIFT BUDGET
This chapter examines the differences between the House
and Senate changes to the strategic sealift budget. It also
examines the differences between the changes to the strategic
sealift budget made by the authorization and appropriations
committees. The purpose of this section is to determine
whether there are appreciable differences, either qualitative
or quantitative, within Congress in terms of treatment of the
strategic sealift budget.
Some patterns are immediately evident. During the
timeframe examined, FY 1981-94, the Senate was frequently more
generous than the House in the area of strategic sealift,
providing an average increase above the House amounts of 13
percent over the fourteen year interval. This pattern was
most evident in the early years of the period.
But this pattern was not as important to the strategic
sealift program as were differences between the authorization
and appropriations committees. The first significant trend
shows that the appropriations committees almost always
provided more financial resources to the strategic sealift
program than did the authorization committees. This trend is
even more important considering that federal law requires that
funds must be authorized before they can be appropriated.
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Although Title 10 of the U.S. Code clearly states this
requirement, appropriators have often provided funding above
the authorized amounts and this provision of the code has
never been tested in court. [Ref . 19] In any case, the
appropriations committees nearly always increased the amount
approved by the authorization committees for strategic
sealif t
.
The other obvious trend showed that the majority of the
legislative provisions, study requirements and initiatives
that shaped the future of the strategic sealift program were
the product of the authorization and appropriations
committees, rather than the full House or Senate. Although
both committees provided policy guidance, the authorization
committees provided the more important policy direction for
the strategic sealift program. This is to be expected, given
the relationship between the authorization and appropriations
process. According to the Manual on the Federal Budget
Process , "The ideal division of labor between these two types
of enactments would be for the appropriations act to determine
the amounts available for expenditure and the authorization
act to determine the purposes for which the funds are to be
used. "[Ref. 20] Although this ideal is not strictly
upheld in the area of strategic sealift, it generally holds
true
.
This chapter is organized on the basis of the same time
periods as the last chapter for purposes of continuity and
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simplicity.
A. THE HOUSE VERSUS THE SENATE
1. The Initial Investment in Strategic Sealift: FY 1981-
85
This period was a time of disagreement between the
Department of Defense and Congress in terms of funding
priorities for strategic sealift. Within Congress, the Senate
displayed a stronger commitment toward providing funding for
strategic sealift than did the House. The only year in which
the House and the Senate were in total agreement for strategic
sealift funding during the fourteen year time period examined
was FY 1983. Even when Congress funded less than the amount
requested by the President, the Senate usually included a
funding level above what was included by the House.
In FY 1981, the most significant difference between
the two chambers was that the Senate provided resources to buy
and convert SL-7 ships for the FSS program, which the House
did not support. This program, initiated by the SASC, was
accepted in the conference committee. The SASC explained its
support for the FSS program as follows:
Although the Navy did not request funds for these vessels,
the committee considers the acquisition and modification
of these eight existing commercial ships to be a high-
priority requirement for national defense. The
availability, cost, speed and capacity of these ships are
compelling arguments for their inclusion in the fiscal
year 1981 Defense budget. [Ref. 21]
The Senate's initiative in FY 1981 would pay dividends later
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when the FSSs proved to be vital assets during Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
Again in FY 1982, Congress and the Department of
Defense disagreed on the direction necessary to solve the
shortages in strategic sealift. Consequently, Congress funded
only a third of the budget request, with the Senate including
more funding than the House during the budget process. The
only line item for sealift funded in FY 1982 was the
continuation of the FSS program initiated in the Senate the
previous year.
Fiscal Year 1985 showed mixed results between the
House and the Senate. During the authorization process, the
Senate Armed Services Committee provided increases to the
budget request, as did the House Appropriations Committee
during the appropriations process. The result was that the
Senate provided greater funding for sealift during the
authorization process while the House provided greater funding
during the appropriations process.
Overall, this period demonstrated that the Senate was
significantly more eager than the House to invest in strategic
sealift. This preference, however, was not as pronounced in
the next two periods. Both chambers used funding preferences
rather than legislative provisions or study requirements to
shape strategic sealift policy in this period.
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2. Decline and Renewal: FY 1986-89
This period was a time of harmony between the
Department of Defense and Congress in terms of funding
priorities for strategic sealift. Throughout this period,
Congress endorsed the approach and size of the Pentagon's
budget for strategic sealift. The changes that were made to
the budget request by the House and the Senate reveal only one
distinct pattern: the House added funding to the Sealift
Support Equipment line item to buy more seasheds . House
support for the seasheds was consistent throughout the life of
the program. Neither the House or Senate produced any
legislative provisions or report requirements in the area of
strategic sealift.
3. The Impact of Desert Shield/Desert Storm: FY 1990-94
Throughout most of this period, Congress differed
greatly with the approach and size of the Pentagon's budget
for strategic sealift. Within Congress, the Senate provided
slightly larger increases than the House to the strategic
sealift budgets. Also, the Senate committees combined to push
legislation attempting to provide solutions to the sealift
problem while addressing the declining U.S. shipbuilding
industry
.
House and the Senate actions on the FY 1990 strategic
sealift budgets were similar, with one exception. The Senate
provided funding for research efforts to develop enhanced fast
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sealift technology to promote defense mobility needs and
provide a boost to the declining U.S. shipbuilding industry.
The members of the Senate Appropriations Committee supported
their brethren in the Senate Armed Services Committee with
respect to the research efforts. Report language from the
Senate's Department of Defense Appropriations Bill states,
the committee is convinced that in order to reinvigorate
the shipbuilding industry, emphasis must be placed on
designing high speed vessels, with low operating costs.
It is hoped that by emphasizing such designs the U.S.
shipbuilding industry can be brought to the forefront in
the design of commercially viable ships, while providing
the sealift which is critically needed for national
defense. [Ref . 22]
Although both the House and Senate provided large
increases to the strategic sealift budget in FY 1991, the
authorization committees had already completed work on their
bills prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Consequently, the
reaction to the invasion was reflected solely in the
appropriations process. Given this fact, it was the House
that displayed greater support for strategic sealift in FY
1991. Even before the invasion, the House included $250
million for sealift ship procurement in the authorization
process and approved $500 million above the amount approved by
the Senate in the appropriations process. The Senate again
supported the fast sealift research efforts and included
funding to continue this. program.
In FY 1992, although the President's budget request
for sealift was increased, there were no significant
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agreements on funding levels or programs within the House or
the Senate.
The House could find no consensus on strategic sealift
in FY 1993, while the Senate demonstrated solidarity by-
initiating funding for the Sealift Ship Technology Development
program. This program evaluated several technology
initiatives that could be applied to both commercial and
military shipping, including simpler ship construction, better
cargo handling, reduced manning requirements and reduced fuel
costs. It had its origins in the efforts of the professional
staff members of the Senate Armed Services
Committee. [Ref . 23] The Senate hoped to accomplish
two interrelated goals with this program, as stated in the
SASC report
:
If developing new technologies resulted in a more
competitive U.S. -flagged fleet, there would be less need
for the government to own and maintain Navy or Maritime
Administration cargo ships. However, there are ships
which have no commercial utility but provide essential
military capability. These ships, which are more
appropriately owned by the government in peacetime, could
derive crews from a larger reservoir of merchant seamen.
[Ref. 24]
Fiscal Year 1994 produced increases in the strategic
sealift budget by both houses of Congress, but no clear trends
in policy oversight. It also produced an attempt by the
Senate to establish a National Defense Strategic Lift Fund.
This fund would have provided a single account to support
strategic mobility requirements for the Department of Defense.
The Senate recommended a total of $2,669.1 million for the
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Fund, reflecting $290.8 million requested for the NDSF and
$2,378.3 million requested for the Air Force's C-17
procurement program. Ultimately, in concurring with the
objections of both the Navy and the Air Force, Congress
rejected the concept of the Fund.
Overall, there was only a small difference in the
funding levels for strategic sealift between the House and the
Senate during this period. Both chambers tended to provide
large increases to fund sealift ship procurement, although the
Senate provided slightly greater funding increases. Neither
the full House or Senate used legislative provisions or study
requirements to a great extent to guide strategic sealift
policy. A greater consensus existed between the authorization
and appropriations committees.
B. AUTHORIZATIONS VERSUS APPROPRIATIONS
1. The Initial Investment in Strategic Sealift: FY 1981-
85
This period differs from the next two periods because
it displays no discernable pattern between the budget totals
in the strategic sealift budget approved by the authorization
and appropriations committees of the House and Senate. In
three of the five years the authorization committees provided
the greater funding levels and the other two years the
appropriations committees approved the higher amount. But
there are some important provisions and report language
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included by the committees in these years.
The FY 1981 Authorization Act required the Secretary
of Defense to conduct a study of the lift requirements for
deployments of U.S. military forces. As stated in the report
from the Senate Armed Services Committee,
The committee also believes that identification of
necessary long-range lift augmentations requires a
thorough analysis of all relevant factors, including
anticipated response-time requirements, comparative
vulnerability, and relative capacities in situations
likely to be of concern to field commanders during the
decade of the 1980 's. This analysis should form the basis
for new airlift and sealift initiatives, as well as for




The study required by the authorization committees, called the
Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study, was completed on 30
April 1981.
The CMMS determined overall U.S. military mobility
requirements, including the total mix of airlift, sealift and
prepositioning necessary for contingencies in the Indian Ocean
area and other areas of potential conflict in the 1980 ' s. The
study looked at different contingencies and used U.S. assets
as they existed in 1981 to determine mobility capabilities and
needs
.
The results of the CMMS verified a shortage of
strategic lift in the U.S. and made some recommendations. The
recommendations included a need for eight FSS (a program
initially funded in FY 1981) , additional dedicated RO/RO type
ships, a prepositioning program (Congress had denied funding
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for this program in FY 1981), some sealift support equipment
such as seasheds and flatracks, and the development of a
Logistics Over The Shore (LOTS) program.
The Department of Defense used the CMMS for planning
and budgeting purposes for the next several years. But in
1983, during DoD's preparation of the POM (Program Objective
Memoranda) for FY 1984-88, questions once again arose over the
amounts of strategic sealift necessary to meet national
defense needs. The Defense Resources Board deferred
consideration of changes to ongoing sealift programs, and
instead, chartered a study to investigate the requirements for
strategic sealift.
This study, completed in March 1984, was titled the
"DoD Sealift Study." It was based upon the forces that were
scheduled to be available in 1988 (including programs funded
but not currently in production) and examined various
scenarios and parameter variations. The study was designed to
consider strategic sealift needs to meet the deployment
objectives identified in the FY 1985-89 Defense Guidance.
The DoD Sealift Study reached many of the same
conclusions that were rendered in the CMMS. The DoD Sealift
Study specified slightly different quantities of sealift ships
and also recommended that the Navy convert some ships to crane
ships for use in ports with no crane capacity.
The CMMS and the DoD Sealift Study would be the basis
for the Defense Department's approach toward solving the
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shortages in strategic sealift for the next several years.
These studies would also provide the basis for congressional
oversight of the strategic sealift budget.
In FY 1982, the appropriators showed some frustration
with the Navy's progress in solving the sealift shortage.
Report language in the House of Representatives 1982
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill states, "To
reiterate, the Committee is deeply concerned about the
continual delay in obtaining this vitally needed capability,




Once again in FY 1984, the appropriators demonstrated
some concern about the Navy's commitment to strategic sealift.
In an example of using budget structure to exert congressional
oversight, the House Appropriations committee directed the
Navy to change the method of classifying sealift funding.
Report language accompanying the House Defense Appropriations
Bill, 1984 states,
Despite the fact that the Department of Defense Five Year
Defense Program (FYDP) accounting structure provides a
specific program line item for airlift and sealift
resources, the Navy has traditionally ignored this
structure and included all sealift funding as a part of
fleet operations. Consequently, it is relatively easy for
the Navy to divert funds during program execution from the
less exciting, but no less important sealift programs.
The Committee believes that the importance of properly
funded sealift programs is clear. [Ref. 27]
In FY 1985, the authorization committees included a
provision in their bill directing the Secretary of the Navy to
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notify the committees prior to acquiring any ships for the
RRF . The committees contended that this provision was enacted
because the Navy could not describe the ships it planned to
acquire during hearings. The provision is symbolic of actions
taken by the authorization committees during this period and
the entire fourteen year timeframe. These committees were
consistent in their attempts to monitor and shape the
strategic sealift program, especially during periods of
perceived uncertainty within the Defense Department
.
Another interesting initiative proposed in FY 1985 by
the appropriators did not survive. A Merchant Ship
Construction Revolving Fund was proposed in the Senate. This
fund was to be derived from unobligated funds available in
prior-year defense appropriation accounts and could also
accrue miscellaneous receipts as provided by the Merchant Ship
Act of 1936. The fund was intended for the construction of
militarily useful commercial ships that would be leased to
private shipping concerns. The appropriations conference
committee reluctantly deleted this recommendation since it had
not been authorized, but encouraged the Administration to
provide a proposal in the future. Although the Merchant Ship
Construction Revolving Fund was never established, it was the
forerunner of the NDSF
.
In summary, during this period no discernable pattern
of budgetary differences between the authorization and
appropriations committees in the area of strategic sealift was
apparent. Both committees, however, displayed some of the
other oversight tools available to Congress. The authorizers
used study requirements and report language to shape strategic
sealift policy. The appropriators used report language and
the accounting structure to mold the strategic sealift budget.
The actions of both committees during this period formed the
framework of strategic sealift well into the future.
2. Decline and Renewal: FY 1986-89
This period is dominated in the budget area by the
appropriations committees. There is a well defined pattern of
appropriations increases above both the Pentagon's request and
the amount authorized for the strategic sealift budget in
almost every fiscal year. In addition, both the authorizers
and the appropriators included some important study
requirements and legislative provisions during this timeframe.
In FY 1986 there was only slight differences between
the budget amount approved by the authorizers and the slightly
higher amount approved by the appropriators. Displaying some
of the harmony characterized by this period, report language
in the House Appropriations Bill states,
In fiscal year 1985, the Committee directed the Department
of the Navy to proceed with the disbursing of 40 to 50
Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships to sites other than the
three sites where the RRF is currently concentrated. The
Navy has actively pursued this initiative and recently
announced their decision to layberth 38 of the ships along
the East and West Coasts by end of fiscal year 1986.
Overall, the Committee is pleased that the Navy has taken
steps to address this important issue. [Ref. 28]
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In addition, the appropriations committees once again
attempted to create a revolving type fund for the strategic
sealift budget. The appropriators designated this recommended
fund the "Mariners Fund" and made available $852.1 million in
unobligated SCN funds for the construction and lease of cargo
vessels configured for the military sealift mission.
Notwithstanding the appropriators' interest in the
establishment of a revolving type fund to promote the
strategic sealift programs, they remained determined to
maintain oversight responsibility of the fund, as noted in the
Appropriations Conference Report,
It is the conferee's intent that, in the event of enabling
legislation, the Appropriation Committees will have ample
time to conduct hearings and otherwise review and approve
any obligations for ship construction under the Mariner
Fund mechanism. The conferees endorse the goal of
establishing a modern sealift fleet, operating under
revenue-producing charters and immediately available for
military use in events of emergencies. However, full
congressional review at both the authorization and
appropriations level is essential to assure the most cost-
effective use of any funds made available to the Mariner
Fund. [Ref . 29]
However, because no authorization was enacted for the Mariner
Fund, it was never established. It would still be several
years until the establishment of the NDSF.
Fiscal year 1988 was noteworthy not for the budgeting
differences between the authorization and appropriations
committees (the appropriators approved slightly more than the
authorizers for the operation and maintenance of the RRF) but
for report language and provisions. The authorization
60
committees initiated a concept called the "Fast Sealift
Initiative, " an effort to identify and purchase, or design,
fast sealift ships with RO/RO capability. This initiative was
an indication of growing congressional concern in the area of
strategic sealift. Report language from the Senate Armed
Services Committee states,
Inadequate strategic mobility is a major deficiency in
carrying out U.S. military strategy. At present, the
United States has substantially more combat capability
than it can deploy in a timely manner during periods of
crisis or war. . . Although substantial progress has been
made in recent years in improving sealift capabilities,
the [Projection Forces and Regional Defense] subcommittee
is concerned about limited fast sealift and insufficient




The authorization committees also noted they would look
favorably upon a request for funds for this program in FY
1989.
The appropriations committees also included report
language that would greatly impact the strategic sealift area.
The committees noted that although MARAD administered the
operations and maintenance of the RRF, the funding was
included in the DoD budget and there was no incentive for
either side to use the funds efficiently. The appropriations
committees included a provision requiring the executive branch
to provide a recommendation to solve this problem.
This language prompted the executive branch to create
a separate line item for funding support of the RRF within the
Department of Transportation section of the President's budget
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each year. With this change, the Defense Department was no
longer required to fund a program it did not control. Also,
MARAD was given a clearly defined funding base for the RRF and
Congress could now provide greater influence over a specific
line item in the budget
.
The budgeting trend of this period continued in FY
1989, with the appropriations committees approving the
assignment of more resources that the authorization
committees. But more important was the report requirement
generated by the authorization committees. These committees
directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on
manpower, mobility, sustainability and equipment which would
later become the MRS (discussed earlier)
.
This report requirement would propel the Defense
Department to reexamine the strategic mobility requirements
that had last been quantified in the CMMS . It would also
emphasize the shortage in strategic sealift and influence the
approach the Pentagon would take to strategic sealift for the
next several years . This requirement would also become the
focal point of congressional discontent over the military's
prioritization and attention to strategic sealift during the
last decade. This discontent is expressed in the Senate's
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989:
For a number of years, the committee has been aware of,
and concerned about, the significant gap in the Nation's
strategic capability caused by the lack of fast sealift.
Hearings this year revealed that solutions to this
deficiency are no closer than when the Congress expressed
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its concern early in the decade by requiring the
Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study. . . Recognizing
that a lack of progress in this area may be due to the
nature of the bureaucracy and the internal ordering of
priorities, the committee believes the time has arrived
when fast sealift should enjoy a higher priority.
[Ref. 31]
In summary, this period showed a pattern of modest
budgetary increases by the appropriations committees over the
authorization amounts in the area of strategic sealift. This
period also displayed the power of the other tools available
to Congress in the oversight process. The appropriations
committees used report language to prompt an executive branch
solution to a resource allocation dispute and prodded DoD to
establish a revolving fund for strategic sealift. The
authorization committees used report language to promote fast
sealift initiatives and to force the Pentagon to reexamine
strategic mobility requirements. These efforts would
foreshadow events of the next period.
3. The Impact of Desert Shield/Desert Storm: FY 1990-94
The appropriations committees gave a higher priority
to strategic sealift than did the authorization committees
during this period. The appropriators increased funding for
the sealift budget every year over the amount approved by the
authorizers. In addition, it was the appropriations
committees that provided the most notable reaction to the
events of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
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Although the Department of Defense did not request
funding for the acquisition of strategic sealift ships in FY
1990, the authorizers initiated funding for long lead
procurement items for sealift ships. The appropriators were
even less patient, approving $600 million to begin acquiring
ships to satisfy the shortage in sealift capacity. The
posture of the appropriators is evident in report language
accompanying the House Appropriations Bill,
It is the Committee's belief that the changing
international environment necessitates an aggressive
enhancement of America's sealift capacity. Talks are
proceeding on a conventional arms agreement and on the
potential redeployment of various U.S. troops presently
stationed abroad. The Committee welcomes these trends but
notes that a retrenchment of large numbers of troops to
the continental United States would make it increasingly
urgent that adequate sealift capacity exists.
Furthermore, a serious sealift shortfall exists under
present conditions. Thus, the Committee has recommended
an ambitious program to procure cargo ships and tankers to
address the sealift shortfall at a time when shipbuilding
capacity exists. Further study and the consequent delays
in procurement would only result in fewer shipyards
available to perform the work required now and in the
future. [Ref . 32]
Fully a year before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the
appropriators' actions targeted on a shortfall in strategic
sealift that would become acute during the conflict.
In FY 1991, the appropriations committees again took
the lead in supporting strategic sealift. The work of the
authorization committees was completed prior to the start of
the Persian Gulf conflict, and the difference between the
budgets approved by the authorizers and the appropriators
existed mainly in the funding for the purchase of strategic
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sealift ships. The authorizers initiated $250 million for
ship acquisitions, which the appropriators increased to $900
million. As stated in the Senate's Appropriations Bill,
The early results of Operation Desert Shield demonstrate
that a serious flaw in our Nation's defense posture is
sealift. The Committee notes that this deficiency was not
unanticipated by the Congress which provided $600,000,000
in fiscal year 1990 for this program. To date, the




This report language would foreshadow congressional
dissatisfaction with the progress in strategic sealift over
the next several years
.
The appropriations committees provided over eight
times the total funding approved by the authorization
committees for strategic sealift in FY 1992. The majority of
the increase was concentrated in the SCN account for sealift
ships, with $600 million appropriated for acquiring these
ships
.
The appropriators again voiced their disapproval of
the actions of the Pentagon in solving the shortage in sealift
capacity in the Conference Report: "The failure of the
Department of Defense to proceed with a sealift program has
accentuated the need for immediate action to correct sealift
deficiencies made evident during Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm. "[Ref. 34]
Although congressional attention was focused mostly on
the debate surrounding the establishment of the NDSF in FY
1993, the appropriations committees again increased the amount
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approved by the authorization committees.
The authorization committees also displayed their will
in the area of strategic sealift. Showing discontent with the
progress of the Defense Department in acquiring sealift ships,
the House Armed Services Committee recommended legislation
that would have tied the obligation of funds for the Air
Force's C-17 program to the obligations of funds for acquiring
sealift ships. Although this provision was not approved by
the conference committee, Congress sent a clear signal to the
Pentagon to raise the priority of strategic sealift programs.
The authorization committees also included a provision
in their final FY 1993 bill titled, "Defense Maritime
Logistical Readiness." This legislation, designed to
revitalize the U.S. shipbuilding industry, established a study
group, required several reports and provided for a penalty for
failure to produce the reports on time.
The trend of budget increases above the authorization
amounts in the strategic sealift budget by the appropriations
committees continued in Fiscal Year 1994. And the House Armed
Services Committee again attempted to expedite the acquisition
of sealift ships that year. Using legislative provisions, the
Committee attempted to condition the obligation of funding for
sealift ships, this time by linking it to the Navy's DDG-51
program. The Senate Armed Services Committee also attempted
to expedite the acquisition of sealift ships. The SASC
included a Sense of the- Senate decree in its report expressing
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support for the prompt award of contracts for sealift ships.
However, neither of these provisions were included in the
final authorization bill after the Navy announced the awarding
of contracts for the conversion and new construction of
sealift ships.
Overall, this period was dominated by budget increases
in the strategic sealift budget by the appropriations
committees. Both the authorization and appropriations
committees used reporting/study requirements, legislative
provisions and report language to shape the strategic sealift
program. In particular, the authorizers used legislative
provisions and reporting requirements to expedite current
Defense Department actions and accelerate planning activities
for the future. The appropriators used report language to
reemphasize the shortage of sealift capacity and to criticize
perceived Pentagon inactivity.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter examined the differences between both the
House and Senate and the authorization and appropriations
committees in terms of changes to the strategic sealift budget
during the timeframe FY 1981-94. Several patterns of
congressional oversight are evident.
Although the House
.
and Senate could not generate a
consensus on strategic sealift issues, there were brief
periods of agreement on specific programs and funding
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priorities. In general, the Senate displayed greater support
for the strategic sealift budget by providing larger and more
frequent funding increases. Neither chamber demonstrated any
significant pattern of influencing sealift policy using the
other tools available to them.
A greater consensus was found in the approaches taken by
the authorization and appropriations committees. Both
committees used report language, study requirements and
legislative provisions to exert their will over the strategic
sealift program. In keeping with their traditional roles
within the budget process, the authorization committees
provided more frequent and more important policy guidance.
Included in the many actions taken by the authorizers, the
study requirements that led to the CMMS and the MRS
significantly influenced strategic sealift policy in the
1980 's and continue to be the framework for policy in the
1990 's. The appropriations committees dominated budgetary-
oversight of strategic sealift by providing constant and
substantial increases.
The next chapter will examine the views of key members of
Congress as they impact the strategic sealift budget. It will
also look at recent developments and actions in the area of
strategic sealift.
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V. THE NATURE OF CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION INTO THE
STRATEGIC SEALIFT PROGRAM
This chapter will examine the motives, influential
factors, philosophies and key figures that have influenced the
strategic sealift budget. It will analyze the nature of the
congressional budget process and the effects of this structure
on the strategic sealift budget. The chapter will then
address the factors influencing the views and actions of the
Department of Defense. This chapter will also address the
opinions and views of Senator Daniel Inouye and Congressman
John Murtha, both of whom play important roles in
congressional oversight of strategic sealift. Finally, an
overview of recent developments in the strategic sealift
program is provided.
A. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT INTERESTS AND ISSUES
The Congress of the United States was established with the
power to "provide for the common defense" of the nation as
just one its many duties. The members of Congress realize the
special significance and responsibility encompassed in this
duty and generally perform this job in a conscious and
deliberate manner.
But Congress is, by design, a political body also. Members
must pursue what they consider to be the best interests of
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their constituents. In some instances, the interests of the
constituents conflict with the interests of the nation as a
whole. It is these two sometimes conflicting responsibilities
that motivate and influence the actions of Congress.
In the area of strategic sealift, it is the responsibility
of Congress to ensure that the Defense Department maintains
the necessary resources to transport military forces to defend
the country and protect U.S. national interests. Members of
Congress often have different ideas about the priority and
allocation of resources necessary to accomplish this important
goal. Parochial interests frequently but not always explain
the different approaches taken to resource allocation.
Although parochial interests almost certainly influenced
congressional oversight of the strategic sealift budget, the
evidence here suggests that such interests were minimal.
In the early 1980 's, the decline of the U.S. merchant
marine industry coincided with increased turmoil in Southwest
Asia. This produced a requirement to enhance the strategic
sealift capability of the military to counter the diminishing
domestic commercial sector. Both Congress and the Pentagon
recognized that a shortage existed in sealift capacity, but
the two branches repeatedly differed as to the priority and
approach to solving the problem.
Congress saw this situation as an unique opportunity to
solve both the shortage in strategic sealift and the decline
of the U.S. merchant marine industry with one policy. The
70
result was congressional intervention into the defense budget
to promote strategic sealift. Over the fourteen year
timeframe used here, Congress consistently attempted to
combine the need for more sealift capacity with the desire for
a strong domestic shipbuilding base.
The actions of Congress between FY 1981 and FY 1994 reveal
a legislative body determined to pursue its version of the
best interests of the nation. There are parochial interests
represented on the committees exercising oversight of the
strategic sealift budget. Representatives from most of the
states with large shipyards are members of these committees.
This fact aside, the frequent criticism by Congress of the
Defense Department's efforts in the strategic sealift area
derive from the continual desire to enhance sealift capacity,
not from pursuit of parochial interests. Although the felt
need to boost the struggling shipbuilding industry is often
mentioned, this motive is usually subservient to the need for
a strong national defense capability. Also, the desire to
assist the shipbuilding industry is usually explained in
congressional reports as an attempt to maintain the defense
industrial base. Although parochial interests may be
influencing policy, the bulk of congressional report language,
study requirements and legislation is justified in terms of




B. KEY CONGRESSIONAL POLICYMAKERS
Two members of Congress have provided more influence over
the strategic sealift budget than any others. The first is
Congressman John Murtha, Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee
of the House Appropriations Committee. The second is Senator
Daniel Inouye, Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the
Senate Appropriations Committee. These two individuals stand
out because of the large influence exerted by the
appropriation committees over the strategic sealift budget.
As pointed out in the previous chapter, it was the
appropriations committees that provided constant and
substantial increases to the strategic sealift budget and also
contributed to the formulation of policy guidance. These two
congressional members largely controlled the actions of these
committees during significant periods of the fourteen year
timeframe
.
Congressman John Murtha, a Democrat from Pennsylvania, was
elected to the House of Representatives for the first time in
1974. He became chairman of the HAC Defense Subcommittee in
1989 and immediately became a leader in defense policy.
Murtha has a variety of reasons to be interested in the
strategic sealift program. He served as a Marine in Vietnam
where he was awarded several decorations including two Purple
Hearts. His experience in the military gives him a unique
insight and expertise into military matters. As a former
member of the Armed Forces, the congressman retains strong
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ties to the military.
Congressman Murtha represents a district that contains
several large steel producing mines and plants. He serves as
a member of the Congressional Mining Caucus and the Chairman
of the Congressional Steel Caucus. Since ships are comprised
largely of steel, Murtha ' s influence over the strategic
sealift program can be very beneficial to his district.
Congressman Murtha ' s advocacy of strategic sealift is
evident in the hearings he conducts during review of the
defense budget . Questions regarding mobility requirements and
sealift capability are a constant reminder to DoD officials of
his concern for strategic sealift. A representative statement
taken from a hearing before his committee in 1993 illustrates
this point
.
We always have to ask about airlift and sealift. If you
don't have adequate airlift and sealift it seems to me it
is a matter of time until you are in bad shape in a
conflict. We in Congress have made airlift and sealift a
high priority. I think you have to continually think
about sealift in particular because of everything that was
taken to Saudi Arabia--95 percent went by sea and we had
a big problem. If it hadn't been for the eight fast
sealift ships Congress added a few years ago, they
wouldn't have been able to deploy in the time they
did. [Ref . 35]
Through Congressman Murtha 's influence and support, the
HAC consistently increased the visibility of and funds for
strategic sealift. In fact, since Murtha has assumed the
chairmanship of the Defense Subcommittee, the HAC has nearly
tripled the amount approved by the HASC for strategic sealift,




Senator Daniel Inouye, the other key congressional
supporter of strategic sealift, is a Democrat from Hawaii.
Senator Inouye was elected to the House of Representatives in
1959 and served there until 1962, when he was elected to the
Senate. He serves on the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of
the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee as well as
the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee. He became the Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee
in 1987. Senator Inouye also has several reasons to show
interest in the strategic sealift budget.
Senator Inouye served in the Army during WWII. He
received a battlefield commission and had tours in Italy and
France. Along with this tie to the Armed Forces, Inouye 's
state of Hawaii has numerous military bases and facilities
which are important to its economy. Representing an island,
Inouye maintains strong ties with the merchant marine industry
and his state has several small shipyards.
Senator Inouye has also made it a practice to help his
fellow Democratic senators from California, a state which
possesses several large shipyards. Since the economy of
Hawaii is closely linked to the economy of California, Inouye
frequently uses his influence and seniority to assist the
larger state. [Ref. 36]
Senator Inouye' s support of strategic sealift is evident
in the hearings he conducts relating to the defense budget.
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Although the senator uses the hearings to ask questions
regarding sealift issues, he also submits statements to be
included in the record. An example of Inouye ' s approach to
strategic sealift is found in this statement submitted for the
record in a hearing before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine
in 1989:
Last October General Carl Vuono, the Army's Chief of
Staff, said his major concern in the event of conventional
war, the Army's biggest area of vulnerability, "is
strategic lift capability" . And, according to the Armed
Forces Journal, "regional commanders-in-chief cite fast
sealift forces as their biggest long term need" . . .
Nevertheless, this morning the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy will tell the Subcommittee that our sealift program
is "in reasonably good health; there is currently no fast
sealift new construction program; and beyond the Ready
Reserve Force, there is no ship procurement program to
improve our sealift posture." Obviously, the agencies of
government are divided on this most vital element of our
national security. This division, in my view, is
symptomatic of the federal government's long standing




Senator Inouye 's concern for sealift has produced
continual increases by the SAC to the strategic sealift
budget
. Since Inouye became chairman of the Defense
Subcommittee, the SAC has nearly tripled the amount
recommended by the SASC for strategic sealift, adding over $6
billion above the level approved by the latter committee.
Both Congressman Murtha and Senator Inouye exercised great
influence over the recent history of the strategic sealift
program. As the leaders of the Defense Subcommittees of their
respective appropriations committees, they were largely
responsible for frequerit and significant increases above the
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levels authorized for the strategic sealift budget. Both
chairmen possess strong ties to the military and parochial
interests relevant to sealift issues. Although the parochial
interests provided some incentive for their involvement in
strategic sealift, the evidence here suggests that both Murtha
and Inouye acted in what they considered to be the best
interests of the nation.
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICIES AND ISSUES
The view from the Department of Defense is significantly
different. The Department of Defense is tasked with defending
the sovereignty and interests of the United States. To
accomplish this goal, the Pentagon must carefully determine
strategies and policies that best utilize the limited
resources allocated to them by Congress. Defense Department
officials must also incorporate the guidance and desires of
Congress within their plans. It is within these plans that
the strategic sealift budget is formulated and executed.
The Defense Department would certainly prefer to acquire
sufficient sealift assets to counter every contingency, but
there are limits to the resources available to them. The
strategic sealift budget, which supports sealift requirements
for the entire U.S. military, must compete against other Navy
programs for limited resources. Within this competition for
resources the policies and issues that influence the size of
the strategic sealift budget become apparent.
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1. Sealift and the Navy Mission
The first factor that influences the priority of the
strategic sealift oudget within the Navy budget involves the
nature of the Navy itself. Since the initial formation of the
nation's naval forces, the Navy's primary missions have been
sea control and power projection. As mentioned earlier,
strategic sealift was not included as a primary mission of the
Navy until 1984. Sea control and power projection mean
warships, and so the Navy focuses most of its attention on
carriers, combatants, and amphibious ships. The glamour,
prestige and pipeline to promotion in the Navy have
traditionally been concentrated on these major platforms. It
is easy to see that strategic sealift programs naturally
receive less attention and emphasis within the Department of
the Navy
.
2. Sealift and Service Priorities
Another factor that tends to lower the priority of
sealift programs with the Navy's budget is the fact that the
Army is the principal user of sealift capacity. Navy leaders
view Army requirements for sealift assets with skepticism
since demand for a product is usually inflated when the
product is free. Navy leaders feel the demand for sealift
ships would be significantly lower if the Army was forced to
fund the strategic sealift budget.
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Further, Congress has historically divided the defense
budget into three roughly equal shares apportioned to each
Service. Since the funds devoted to strategic sealift by the
Navy are ultimately providing mission support for the Army,
the interservice rivalry between the two members of the Armed
Forces promotes a reluctance to allocate valuable resources to
support a rival. This rivalry is best explained in The
Defense Game
,
Sea and air transport has long been underemphasized in the
U.S. military. The emergence of the Persian Gulf as a new
"vital interest" for the United States only exacerbated
the problem. The reason for this is straightforward:
airlift and sealift are provided by the Air Force and Navy
in support of the Army. These services assign first
priority to forces and programs which support their own
combat missions rather than spend money on what they view
as secondary missions to the Army".[Ref. 38]
Compounding this rivalry, the withdrawal of the U.S.
military from foreign shores means the continental based Army
will become increasingly more dependent on strategic sealift.
This will produce an increase in the Army's sealift
requirements and pressure for the Navy to devote additional
financial resources to strategic sealift to support their
rivals
.
3 . Sealift and the Availability of Commercial Shipping
Another factor that influences the Navy's perception
of strategic sealift is the availability of sealift ships on
the world market. This factor was particularly powerful in
the initial years of the strategic sealift program. After
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World War II, the U.S. possessed a large merchant fleet and
the Navy had little need for strategic sealift ships when they
were readily available in the domestic market. Even as the
U.S. merchant fleet declined, Navy leaders could point to the
pool of ships in the world market as an accessible charter
source. And although Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
demonstrated the shortage of sealift capacity possessed by the
military, the Navy was still able to amass a fleet of sealift
ships by chartering off the world market.
4. Sealift and the Uncertainty Surrounding Operational
Requirements
Another issue affecting the Navy's view of the
strategic sealift program involved the uncertainty surrounding
the precise size of the sealift shortage. During the initial
investment in strategic sealift and then again in the early
1990 's, the Navy looked to reevaluate its plan to provide
sealift capability for the military. Although Congress
frequently criticized both the Defense Department and the Navy
during these two periods for the progress and emphasis of
sealift programs, the Navy justified its cautious approach by
citing the need to wait for the results of the two mobility
studies, the CMMS and the MRS. In both cases, the Navy
preferred to delay any expenditure of funds until validation
of specific sealift requirements existed.
The Secretary of the Navy conveyed this viewpoint in
congressional testimony in 1989:
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There are no formal operational requirements sufficient to
justify initiating a new program for high speed sealift
ships. This is because the mobility studies only conclude
that we are incapable of delivering all the CINCs' cargo
on time. . . Other alternatives includes prepostioning-
ashore or afloat, more airlift, earlier availability of
Army units, etc. Until an analysis has been completed to
determine which alternative, or combination of
alternatives, provides the most capability for any
additional funds invested in strategic mobility, there can
be no validated operational requirement
.
[Ref . 39]
The Navy reasoned that all mobility options should be explored
before committing funds to a program in order to produce the
most efficient use of their resources.
The reasons listed above show some of the factors that
influence the Navy's view of the strategic sealift budget.
The nature of the Navy itself, the rivalry with the Army and
the conflict between resource users and providers, the
availability of sealift ships on the world market and
uncertainty concerning the solution to the sealift shortage
problem all affected the Navy's approach to the strategic
sealift program. Given the factors that influence the Navy's
position, their actions with regards to strategic sealift seem
reasonable. These factors notwithstanding, the Navy did
request nearly $8 billion for the strategic sealift program
over 14 years
.
D. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STRATEGIC SEALIFT
The issues and interests that influence the Department of
Defense and Congress are apparent in the recent developments
that have taken place in the area of strategic sealift.
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The most significant of these developments has been the
awarding of contracts for the conversion and acquisition of
sealift ships. These ships are scheduled to become the heart
of the military's sealift capacity for the next several
decades. The contracts will also provide substantial work for
several shipyards and defense contractors, maintaining a
portion of the defense industrial base and providing support
for the domestic shipbuilding industry.
1. Ship Conversions
On 30 July 1993, the Defense Department awarded the
contracts for the design and conversion of five strategic
sealift ships. The five ships are all Large Medium Speed
RO/RO's (LMSR) . They are the five existing ships built in
foreign shipyards that Congress allowed the Pentagon to
purchase for conversion.
The Navy briefly considered eliminating the ship
conversions due to higher than expected conversion costs,
higher life cycle costs and the shorter life span of the
ships. But, congressional pressure to take action to reduce
the sealift capacity shortage and Pentagon concerns over the
short term need for sealift assets prompted the Navy to award
the contracts
.
The Navy's decision to award the conversion contracts
shows the contrasting influences and issues affecting the
military and Congress in the area of strategic sealift. The
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Navy examined the ship conversion option and discovered that
the purchase and conversion of an existing ship would cost
more than simply constructing a new ship. The new ship would
have a longer life span although there would be a time gap of
approximately four years before the new ship could be
delivered. Navy officials pointed to the cost efficiency of
new construction and argued that any cost savings in the area
of sealift could easily be shifted to other service
priorities. In addition, the gap in ship delivery dates could
temporarily be filled through chartering from the world
market
.
The congressional viewpoint was much different. The
perception in Congress was that the Navy's rejection of the
conversion option was another attempt to delay funding of
important strategic sealift assets. Along with the delay in
money needed to revitalize the slumping domestic shipbuilding
industry, Congress also was alarmed with the gap in sealift
capacity during the period between ship delivery dates and its




Navy Secretary John Dalton weighed both options and
finally decided that the conversion of existing ships for the
strategic sealift program was in the best interests of the
Navy. Although more expensive, awarding the contracts for the
ship conversions would alleviate congressional pressure and





The first ship conversion contract was awarded to
National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) in San Diego,
California for three ship conversions, the other to Newport
News Shipbuilding (NNS) in Newport News, Virginia for the
remaining two ships. The ship conversions are due to be
completed in late 1996.
2. New Ship Construction
In September 1993, the Navy announced the awarding of
two contracts for the new construction of up to 12 new LMSRs
.
The first contract for the construction of a new strategic
sealif t ship was awarded on 2 September 1993 . This contract
went to Avondale Industries, Incorporated (All) in New
Orleans, Louisiana. The contract contains options for five
additional ships after the completion of the first ship. The
initial ship is scheduled to be completed in 2001. The other
contract was awarded on 15 September 1993 and went to NASSCO.
This contract is also for the construction of one ship with
options for five other new ships.
The conversion and construction contracts will produce
17 strategic sealif t ships for the Navy. These ships will
augment the eight current FSSs and should satisfy a
substantial amount of the current sealif t capacity shortage.
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E. SUMMARY
This chapter examined the motives, influential factors,
philosophies and key figures that have affected the strategic
sealift budget. Several significant factors are apparent.
Evidence shows that Congress has faithfully executed its
role in providing funds and policy direction for strategic
sealift. Its actions have been based on a perception of the
best interests of the nation in combination with some
parochial interests.
The key figures in congressional oversight of the
strategic sealift budget, Congressman John Murtha and Senator
Daniel Inouye, have greatly affected the funding levels and
policy guidance in this important area of the defense budget.
The Defense Department, and particularly the Navy, have
also attempted to address the strategic sealift shortage.
Their approach was more cautious and deliberate than Congress
would have preferred, but not unexpected given the factors
that influence them.
The recent developments in the strategic sealift program
are major steps in solving the sealift capacity shortage.
Congressional support of the ship conversion option was
consistent with its efforts to enhance sealift capacity while
assisting the domestic shipbuilding industry. The Navy's
initial opposition to the ship conversion option is congruent
with the approach it has taken over the past fourteen years.
The contract awards should provide the military with
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sufficient strategic mobility while also maintaining a portion





This chapter first summarizes the trends and major events
associated with congressional oversight of the strategic
sealift budget over the past 14 years. It then offers
suggestions for further study.
A. TRENDS AND MAJOR EVENTS IN STRATEGIC SEALIFT
Strategic sealift capability is a fundamental element of
the National Security Strategy. In the early 1980 's, the
decline of the U.S. merchant marine industry, turmoil in
Southwest Asia and the growth of the Soviet Union's military
focused attention on strategic sealift issues. In the early
1990 's, the area of strategic sealift was again highlighted
due to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from foreign lands and
the Persian Gulf conflict. The demise of the Soviet Union
marked the end of the Cold War and removed the immediate
threat of a full scale land battle in Europe. No longer
facing the Soviet threat, the U.S. began withdrawing troops
stationed overseas to counter mounting domestic fiscal
problems. This made U.S. military strategy more reliant on
strategic sealift in preparing to respond to regional
contingencies.
Throughout this timeframe, Congress and the Pentagon
agreed that a shortage in strategic sealift capacity existed.
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But they differed on the priority and amount of resources
necessary to solve the capacity shortfall. The differences
were reflected in congressional oversight of the strategic
sealift budget.
1. Congressional Budgetary Oversight
Several broad trends and patterns are evident in
congressional oversight of the strategic sealift budget during
the period FY 1981-1994. While Congress reduced the total
Department of Defense budget request in 12 of the 14 years,
the budget for strategic sealift was increased in nine of
those years. These increases for strategic sealift initiated
by Congress were substantial, adding over $1.2 billion to DoD
requests
.
Congressional budgetary oversight can be broken into
three distinct timeframes: the Initial Investment into
Strategic Sealift (FY 1981-85) ; a period of Decline and
Renewal (FY 1986-89); and a period reflecting the Impact of
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (FY 1990-94)
.
During the Initial Investment period, Congress and the
military could not find agreement on a strategy to solve the
sealift capacity shortfalls. Congress intervened into the
strategic sealift budget frequently, initiating some programs
while denying or reducing funding for other programs. Even
with the disagreement, several important ship acquisition
programs were begun and advances in sealift capacity were
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accomplished.
In the period of Decline and Renewal, Congress and the
Pentagon maintained similar views on the amount and type of
resources needed for sealift. This period produced
appropriations very near the DoD budget requests for strategic
sealift
.
The demise of the Soviet Union and Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm produced another period of significant
differences in terms of priorities for strategic sealift
between the Defense Department and Congress. Congress
initiated large budget increases to fund strategic sealift
programs resulting from its dissatisfaction with the progress
of the military in solving the sealift shortage.
2. Oversight Differences Within Congress
In addition to the differences between Congress and
DoD regarding strategic sealift, there were other differences,
both qualitative and quantitative, within the Congress itself
in terms of treatment of the strategic sealift budget.
Neither the House nor the Senate could generate a
consensus on strategic sealift issues, although there were
short periods of understanding on specific programs and
funding priorities . The Senate provided more support for
sealift programs than the House, providing slightly larger and
more frequent budget increases. Neither chamber demonstrated
a pattern of influencing sealift policy using the other
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legislative instruments available to them.
The authorization and appropriations committees found
greater harmony. In keeping with their customary role within
the budget process, the authorization committees provided
significant policy guidance. The authorization committees
produced frequent and important study requirements, report
language and policy direction for strategic sealift. It was
the authorizers that produced the study requirements that led
to the CMMS and the MRS. These two studies completed by the
Defense Department shaped strategic sealift policy in the
1980 's and continue to influence policy in the 1990' s.
The appropriators also produced some policy guidance.
However, these committees broke with congressional tradition
by consistently approving budgets for sealift in excess of the
levels set by the authorizing committees. Their efforts on
behalf of the military's sealift capability were motivated in
part by parochial interests.
3. Viewpoints, Interests and Influential Factors
This analysis showed that Congress and the Defense
Department view the issues surrounding the strategic sealift
budget differently. These differences are rooted in
institutional perspectives , i.e., the interests characteristic
of the legislative and executive branches of the government.
Congress urged a quick solution which also provided relief to
the domestic shipbuilding industry. The executive branch--in
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this case the Navy--took a narrower and more cautious
approach. The Navy viewed strategic sealift as one of many
aspects of the Navy mission, and certainly not the most
important one. It resisted the idea that limited Navy
resources should be used to support an activity that was
peripheral to the Navy mission, unless and until it could be
demonstrated that this activity warranted a higher priority.
Congress is tasked with maintaining a strong national
defense, including sufficient strategic sealift capability to
preserve national interests. But Congress is a political
body, requiring representatives to pursue the best interests
of their constituents as well. In the area of strategic
sealift, these interests are primarily represented by the
domestic shipbuilding industry. The evidence suggests that
parochial interests influenced the actions of Congress, but
they did not dominate them.
The Department of Defense is tasked with defending the
sovereignty and interests of the United States. This must be
accomplished using the resources allocated to them by
Congress. The Navy, assigned to provide the strategic sealift
capability for the military, must consider a variety of
factors that influence the priority and amount of financial
assets devoted to sealift.
The Navy's historical preference towards warships,
along with its emphasis on controlling the seas and projecting
naval power, minimized the attention directed to sealift
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concerns . Because the Navy was the provider but not the user
of sealift, it questioned the Army's requirements for sealift
assets. Also affecting the Navy's perception is the
availability of commercial charter vessels. Reservations of
this kind encouraged the Navy to avoid committing new
resources to strategic sealift prior to the completion of
studies which would validate such an investment.
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
While the contracts awarded in 1994 for the acquisition of
strategic sealift ships have provided a boost to the
struggling domestic shipbuilders, the long term future of the
merchant marine industry is still uncertain. Both the number
of domestic shipyards and the size of the U.S. -flagged
merchant fleet are rapidly declining. The loss of these vital
assets could have disastrous consequences for the security of
the nation.
Two recent initiatives aspire to solve these problems.
Congress passed the Defense Maritime Logistical Readiness
program as part of the FY 1993 Defense Authorization Act to
address the declining numbers of shipyards
.
[Ref . 42]
More recently, Transportation Secretary Federico Pena proposed
a plan to save the U.S. merchant fleet. [Ref. 43]
The Defense Maritime Logistical Readiness plan was
formulated to revitalize the U.S. shipbuilding industry. The
initiative instructs the President to establish an interagency
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working group to develop and implement a comprehensive
approach to preserve the shipyard industrial base in this
country. The group will consist of representatives from many
agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Labor, State,
Commerce, and Transportation, along with members from the
Maritime Administration and the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative. The group is required to submit a series of
reports to Congress providing recommendations to bolster the
domestic shipbuilding industry.
Secretary Pena ' s plan to preserve the U.S. -flagged
merchant fleet was released on 10 March 1994. The initiative
proposes to replace current operating subsidies that expire in
1998 with new subsidies containing more stringent requirements
for participating U.S. companies. This ten year plan would
cost $1 billion dollars and be paid for through increased
taxes on ships entering U.S. ports. The plan would offer the
operating subsidies to help U.S. firms make up the cost
differentials that exist when operating with American crews
and U.S. Coast Guard safety requirements.
These initiatives should be evaluated as to their
effectiveness on the merchant marine industries and on U.S.
strategic sealift.
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CONGRESS AND THE SEALIFT BUDGET
FY 1981-1985
(Dollars in Thousands)
FUNDING DOD HOUSE SENATE AUTH. HOUSE SENATE
-APPN
CATEGORY REQUEST AUTH. AUTH. CONFER.
-APPN. iAPPN. CONF
= = = = = = = = = = = == = s== = = = = = := = = = = = := = ====:= == = = =:= = = = = = = = = = = = := = = :
FY 1981
SCN TAKX SHIP 207000 207000 207000 207000
SCN SL-7
TOTAL
285000 285000 285000 285000 31 I
207000 207000 492000 285000 285000 492000 31'
FY 1982
O&MN MPS EQUIP 8000
SCN T-AKX MPS 195000 195000 195000
SCN T-AKS RO/RO 197000 197000 197000 197000
SCN T-AKX FAST LOG 668400 465100 668400 184000 184000 323000 30'
SCN T-AH HOSPITAL 10000 10000
SCN T-AKX CONV/CHAR 60000 60000




1138400 913100 1061400 386000 184000 388000 30'
FY 1983
SCN T-AH HOSPITAL 300000 300000 300000 300000 300000 300000 30(




662600 622600 622600 622600 344000 344000 34<
FY 1984
O&MN SEALIFT PREPOS. 287800 272800 287800 287800 286200 286200 28(
O&MN SEALFT SUP EQUI 32400 32400 32400 32400 32400 32400 3!
SCN T-AKR CONV 246500 246500 246500 246500 219000 236400 23(
SCN T-AH HOSPITAL 260000 260000 260000 260000 210000 224000 22<
SCN STRAT SEALFT RRF 31000 31000 31000 31000 31000 31000 31




907800 868400 892700 892700 813600 845000 83i
FY 1985
O&MN SEALIFT/RRF OPS 59131 59131 66831 66831 66831 66831 6(
O&MN RRF DISPERSAL 5000 1
O&MMC PREPOS EQPT 27200 27200 2/
SCN STRATEGIC SEALIFI 31000 31000 31000 31000 15000 31000 31
SCN T-ACS CONV 44000 44000 44000 44000 36000 36000 3t
SCN T-AVB CONV 42800 42800 42800 42800 31800 26600 31
OPN SEALIFT SUP EQUI
TOTAL
24100 24100 24100 24100 24100 5600 2i
201031 201031 208731 208731 205931 193231 221
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Programs and Financial Control
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DOD HOUSE SENATE AUTH. HOUSE SENATE APPN.
REQUEST AUTH. AUTH. CONFER. APPN. APPN. CONFER.
FY 1986
MN SEALIFT GROWTH 787300 771300 787300 771300 771300 787300 787300
MN RRF DISPERSAL 3600 3600
N STRATEGIC SEALIFI 203400 228400 203400 228400 228400 223400 228400
N T-ACS CONV 82500 82500 82500 82500 74000 74000 74000
NT-AVBCONV 26900 26900 26900 26900 26900 26900 26900
N SEALIFT SUP EQUIP 58972 73972 70972 70972 70972 58972 70972
TAL 1159072 1183072 1171072 1180072 1175172 1170572 1191172
FY 1987
MN RRF DISPERSAL 31300 31300 31300 31300 30800 35155 35155
NT-ACS CONV 61100 61100 61100 61100 61100 61100 61100
M STRATEGIC SEALIFI 27800 27800 27800 27800 77800 77800
N SEALIFT ENHANCE 20700 20700 20700 20700 20700








F FAST SEALFT INIA
N SEALIFT SUP EQUI
N SEALT COMM EQUI
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rce: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Programs and Financial Control
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CONGRESS AND THE SEAUFT BUDGET
FY 1990-1994
(Dollars in Thousands)
FUNDING DOD IHOUSE SENATE tHUTH. HOUSE JSENATE APPN.
CATEGORY REQUEST AUTH. i*UTH. IDONFER. i*PPN. APPN. IDONFl
1990
O&MN SEALIFT 432621 432621 432621 432621 432621 432621 432
SCN FAST SEALIFT SHP 20000 20000 20000 1000000 1020000 60(
OPN AMPHIB EQUIP 5398 5398 21898 21898 21898 5398 2^
OPN SEALFT SUP EQUIP 10571 10571 10571 10571 10571 10571 1(
RDT&E FSS TECH DEV
TOTAL
30000 15000 15000 1*
448590 468590 515090 500090 1465090 1483590 107$
FY 1991
O&MN SEALIFT 461732 461732 461732 461732 500000 461732 50C
SCN STRAT SEALIFT 250000 250000 1500000 1000000 90C
SCN PREPOS/RRF 900000
OPN AMPHIB EQUIP 2207 2207 2207 2207 2207 2207 rc
OPN SEALFT SUP EQUIP 21944 21944 21944 21944 21944 21944 21
RDT&E SEALFT TECH DE
TOTAL
30000 3402 e1
485883 735883 515883 735883 2924151 1489285 142/
FY 1992
O&MN RRF 30000 3(
SCN SEALIFT 1364100 1300000 60(
OPN AMPHIB EQUIP 86049 86049 86049 86049 92049 86049 9;
OPDEF PREPOS 995000 2000000
RDT&E MSNAP 1886 1886 1886 1886 1886 1886 1




87935 87935 1468035 88935 2418935 2087935 72£
FY 1993
SCN SEALIFT 1201400 225000 801400
NATL DEF SEALFT FUND 1201400 613200 1201400 61C
OPN AMPHIB EQUIP 1714 1714 1714 1714 23714 1714 2:
RDT&E(DEF) MOBOFFBA 7000 7
RDT&E SEAL TECH PGM
TOTAL
13400 13400 13400 1C
1203114 1203114 240114 628314 832114 1216514 657
FY 1994
O&MN PREPOS/SURGE 507725 507725 501
NATL DEF SEALFT FUND 290800 290800 290800 490800 29C
NATL DEF STRAT FUND 2669100 2669100
OPN AMPHIB EQUIP 2639 2639 2639 2639 2639 2639 ri
RDT&E(DEF) MOBOFFBA 24000 17000 17
RDT&E(DEF) MAR TECH
TOTAL
132556 50000 190556 3£
293439 425995 2671739 343439 1215720 3196464 85£














































V / <o _—
SSL co re





















1. National Security Council, National Security Sealift
Policy, p. 1, October 5, 1989.
2. Joints Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the
United States, p. 11, January 19 92.
3. Ibid, p. 11.
4. Johnson, GEN Hansford T., "Statement of Commander-in-Chief,
U.S. Transportation Command before the Subcommittee on
Merchant Marine, U.S. House of Representatives, in connection
with Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Sealift Performance
and Future Sealift Requirements", pp. 9-10, April 23, 1991.
5. O'Rourke, Ronald, "U.S. Strategic Sealift: Sustaining the
Land Battle", Sea Power, p. 1, Vol 7 no. 3, 1986.
6. Garrett III, H. Lawrence, "Testimony before the
Subcommittee on Defense, U.S. House of Representatives, in
connection with the Department of Defense Appropriations for
1993-Part 1", Washington D.C., p. 279, March 11, 1992.
7. Hura, Myron, Matsumura, John, and Robinson, John, An
Assessment of Alternate Transports for Future Mobility
Planning, RAND National Defense Research Institute, R-4245-
ACQ, Santa Monica, CA, pp. 3-16, 1993.
8. Shipbuilders Council of America, Bringing Back America's
Shipyards-A Major Step Toward Bringing Back America's
Independence, Washington D.C., p. 5, 1990.
9. Stocker, John J., "Statement for the Record of the
President, Shipbuilders Council of America, before the
Subcommittee on Merchant Marine, U.S. Senate", Washington
D.C.
, p. 50, July 13, 1989.
10. Joint Department of Defense/Department of Transportation
Ready Reserve Force Working Group, The Ready Reserve Force:
Enhancing a National Asset, Logistics Management Institute, p.
1-7, October 1991.
11. Interview between Ronald O'Rourke, Congressional Research
Service, and the author, 27 January 1994.
98
12. U.S Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration,
History of Ready Reserve Force Funding, Washington D.C., 17
September 1993
.
13. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Programs and
Financial Control
14. Jenkins, William F., National Defense Sealift Fund, point
paper for Strategic Sealift Division of OPNAV, 22 July 1993.
15. Ibid. , p. 1.
16. U.S. Senate, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1993, Report 102-352, 31 July 1992, p. 37.
17. U. S. House of Representatives, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Report 102-966,
October 1, 1992, p. 752.
18. Ibid. , p. 181.
19. Berner, Keith and Daggett, Stephen, A Defense Budget
Primer, Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C.,
Report 93-317 F, March 9, 1993.
20. Schick, Allen; Keith, Robert and Davis, Edward, Manual on
the Federal Budget Process, Congressional Research Service,
Washington D.C., Report 91-902 GOV, December 24, 1991.
21. U.S. Senate, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1981, Report 96-826, p. 30.
22. U.S. Senate, Department of Defense Appropriation Bill,
1990, Report 101-132, p. 156.
23. Interview of 25 January 1994 with Creighton Green, staff
member, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington D.C.
24. U.S. Senate, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1993, Report 102-352, p. 105.
25. Ibid, p. 31.
26. U.S. House of Representatives, Department of Defense
Appropriation Bill, 1982, Report 97-333, p. 217.
27. U.S. House of Representatives, Department of Defense
Appropriation Bill, 1984, Report 98-427, p. 82.
28. U.S. House of Representatives, Department of Defense
Appropriation Bill, 1986, Report 99-332, p. 103.
99
29. U.S. House of Representatives, House Joint Resolution 465,
Further Continuing Appropriations For Fiscal Year 1986 , Report
99-450, p. 276.
30. U.S. Senate, National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal
Years 1988 And 1989, Report 100-57, p. 11.
31. U.S. Senate, National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal
Year 1989, Report 100-326, p. 52.
32. U.S. House of Representatives, Department of Defense
Appropriations Bill, 1990, Report 101-208, p. 5.
33. U.S. Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill,
1991, Report 101-521, p. 114.
34. U.S. House of Representatives, Making Appropriations for
the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September
30, 1992, and for Other Purposes, Report 102-328, p. 110.
35. Murtha, John P., Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of
Representatives, 5 March 1992, p. 698.
36. Interview with Larry Caviola, Chief of Staff, Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 26
January 1994.
37. Inouye, Daniel K., Statement before the Subcommittee on
Merchant Marine, Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, U.S. Senate, 13 July 1989, p. 2.
38. Stubbing, Richard A. and Mendel, Richard A., The Defense
Game , Harpers & Row, Publishers, 1986.
39. Secretary of the Navy, letter dated 22 March 1989.
40. Dalton Prepares To Make Critical Decisions On Sealift
Programs, Inside The Navy, 26 July 1993.
41. MacFarland, Margo, Navy Decides To Go Ahead With
Conversion Of Five Sealift Ships, Inside The Navy, 3 July
1993.
42. U.S. House of Representatives, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Report 102-966, pp.
181-183.
43. Phillips, Don, "10-Year, $1 Billion Plan Offered by Pena










Professor Richard B. Doyle, Code AS/DY
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5100




Strategic Sealift Division (N42)
2 000 Navy Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20350-2000
Professor Peter Tarpgaard
NSDM Department, Code 1B1
686 Cushing Road
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02841
Ronald O'Rourke
Congressional Research Service
Foreign Affairs & National Defense Division
Madison Building, Room 315
10 First Street SE
Washington D.C. 20540








NAVAL POSTGRADI I«T SCHOm
MONTEREY CA 93943-5101
GAYLORD S

